University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 53
2020

Calculating Compensation Sums for Private Law Wrongs:
Underlying Imprecisions, Necessary Questions, and Toward a
Plausible Account of Damages for Lost Years of Life
Michael Pressman
NYU School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Legal Remedies Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Pressman, Calculating Compensation Sums for Private Law Wrongs: Underlying Imprecisions,
Necessary Questions, and Toward a Plausible Account of Damages for Lost Years of Life, 53 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 597 (2020).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol53/iss3/4

https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.53.3.calculating
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

CALCULATING COMPENSATION SUMS FOR PRIVATE LAW
WRONGS: UNDERLYING IMPRECISIONS, NECESSARY
QUESTIONS, AND TOWARD A PLAUSIBLE ACCOUNT OF
DAMAGES FOR LOST YEARS OF LIFE
Michael Pressman∗

ABSTRACT
The ubiquitous corrective-justice goals of “making a party whole” or “returning
a party to the position she was in” are typically understood in monetary terms,
and in this context it is fairly clear what these terms mean. If, as this Article
argues, these corrective-justice goals should instead be understood in terms of
something that has intrinsic value, such as happiness, various imprecisions come
to the fore. This Article identifies and explores these imprecisions and, in so doing,
articulates a novel framework that can be used for understanding and
systematizing our approach to private law remedies. This is the Article’s first task.
Next, the Article focuses on the imprecision that the law must grapple with
whose implications are most salient: how to aggregate happiness across years of a
life. This imprecision becomes significant in the context of torts that shorten a
person’s life. The Article explores the appropriate measure of damages (under a
corrective-justice theory) in cases in which a victim has her expected future
shortened by a tort (e.g., medical malpractice or exposure to carcinogens), but in
which she has not yet died. The fact that the victim is still alive makes it possible to
compensate the victim herself directly for the value of life-years. Should she be
compensated? The question, already critical in a number of cases, will
substantially increase in prevalence with developments in science and technology
in the coming years. This Article argues, contra current law in most states, that
the law should take these types of cases seriously and that victims should be
compensated if their loss of life-years constitutes a loss of happiness. The contrary
position is in great tension with the commonsense intuition that losing life-years is
one of the most (if not the most) serious harms that one can incur. But is our
commonsense intuition correct?
The Article proposes a three-step framework that can be used for addressing
these questions of loss and getting to the appropriate measure of monetary
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compensation: (1) Determine which “happiness aggregation function” to espouse,
(2) determine how much happiness (if any), according to one’s happiness
aggregation function of choice, a plaintiff lost as a result of the harm; and (3)
determine how much monetary compensation will bring about a transfer of
happiness to the plaintiff that will equal the amount that she lost (according to
one’s happiness aggregation function of choice).
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INTRODUCTION
1
Arguably the entire purpose of private law remedies is to make
an aggrieved party whole, or, said differently, to make it the case

1. I say “arguably” because while this formulation reflects a backward-looking account
of private law remedies (espoused, in the context of tort law, by corrective justice theorists),
there also is another account: a forward-looking account (espoused by law-and-economics
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that a person who is aggrieved can (as best as possible) have the
harm he incurred be undone. Or, said differently still, the purpose
of private law remedies arguably is to bring a person back to
“where he was,” to “the position that he was in,” or to “the level that
he was at” before incurring the harm that he incurred. Different
remedies in different areas of private law have different doctrines,
but they all employ this notion of bringing a person back to the
level that he was at.
But what does it mean to bring a person back to where he was or
the level that he was at? Although it is a notion that sits at the very
core of private law remedies—and, indeed, is ubiquitous across all
areas of the law—the concept of “the level that one is (or was) at”
turns out to be under-described, imprecise, and vague in various
ways—even though these imprecisions have seemingly gone unnoticed.
This Article identifies these imprecisions, and it explores the various ways and contexts in which the law confronts them and is, as a
result, forced to grapple with how best to articulate more precise
formulations. The main context in which the law confronts these
imprecisions is in “different-numbers cases,” a category of cases
that this Article will introduce, and the most important example of
which involves the determinations that courts must make regarding how to compensate plaintiffs in tort law for having their lives
shortened by a defendant’s tortious behavior. More specifically, the
determinations at issue here are about how to compensate for a
particular component of a claim arising out of the tortious shortening of life: how to compensate for the harm of failing to experi2
ence the years of life that were lost (the victim’s “hedonic loss” ).
After showing how the imprecisions come to the fore in this context, this Article explores the law’s treatment of these cases, which
reveals that the law generally fails to compensate plaintiffs for the
lost life-years themselves.
The legal system could confront cases of plaintiffs seeking a
remedy for the harm of lost life-years in two contexts: First, a case
might be brought after a victim has died. In such a case, although a
remedy for the lost life-years arguably might be warranted in order
3
to bring about optimal incentives for future tortfeasors, it could be

theorists). I explain in Part I.B, infra, the various reasons for why it is defensible and, indeed
optimal, for this Article to proceed through a backward-looking lens.
2. For usage of the term “hedonic loss,” see, e.g., Cass Sunstein & Eric Posner, Dollars
and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 544–45 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, An Economic Analysis of Tort Damages for Wrongful Death, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1119–20 (1985); Sunstein & Posner, supra note 2, at 556; Michael
Pressman, Hedonic-Loss Damages that Optimally Deter: An Alternative to “Value of a Statistical Life”
that Focuses on Both Decedent and Tortfeasor (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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argued that plaintiffs should not recover for this harm because this
harm was to a victim who is no longer alive and therefore cannot
4
be compensated. This Article, however, primarily explores a second context in which plaintiffs might seek a remedy for the harm
of lost life-years: cases in which a victim has her expected future
shortened by a tort (e.g., medical malpractice or exposure to carcinogens), but in which she has not yet died. In a case of this type,
the fact that the victim is still alive makes it possible to compensate
the victim herself directly for the value of life-years. Thus, even if
compensation for lost life-years is not warranted in cases where the
victim is dead, it might still be warranted in cases where the victim
is still alive.
The fact that the law generally fails to compensate plaintiffs for
lost life-years even when the victim is alive and able, herself, to be
compensated is in great tension with the commonsense intuition
that having one’s life shortened is one of the most (if not the most)
serious harms that one can incur. If this commonsense intuition is
correct, the rule against compensation for a person whose life is
shortened seemingly is an egregious gap in the law that needs to
be filled.
This Article explores the appropriate measure of damages for
situations where a victim has her expected future shortened by a
tort but in which she has not yet died, and it argues, contra current
law in most states, that the law should takes these types of cases seriously and that victims should be compensated if their loss of life5
years constitutes a loss of happiness. Although this Article does
not provide a conclusive answer to the questions of whether, and, if
so, how much, a person should be compensated for having her life
shortened, the Article’s analysis of the imprecisions in the concept
of “the level that one is at” enables us to recognize the existence of
and identify important unanswered questions—and, indeed, unasked questions—in this area of the law, and provides us with the
theoretical framework and tools to answer them. These questions
are not only theoretical, but also practical—with our answers having important tangible impacts on the lives of many. Further, not
only is it already crucial that we articulate plausible answers now,
but the Article argues that developments in science and technology
in the coming years will substantially increase the frequency with

4. Some might argue, however, that, even if the victim cannot be compensated for the
lost life-years, it would be appropriate for her estate to be compensated for this harm.
5. Although this Article focuses on situations in which the victim is still alive at the
time of the suit, the analysis in this Article will also apply to cases where the victim is no
longer alive if one is of the view that plaintiffs should indeed recover for a victim’s “hedonic
loss” even in cases where the victim is dead at the time of the suit.
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which the law confronts these questions, thus making the current
inquiry all-the-more urgent.
*

*

* *

The Article proceeds as follows:
Part I provides two brief preliminary discussions. First, it provides descriptions and examples of “different-numbers problems”
so that the reader can more vividly grasp the nuts and bolts of
these problems, the issues they raise, and why they are so difficult
to satisfactorily resolve. Second, Part I (1) provides descriptions
and clarifications regarding forward-looking and backward-looking
accounts of tort law (and of private law more generally)—which
correspond, respectively, to the positions of the law-and-economics
theorist and of the corrective-justice theorist; (2) explains the interactions between the two accounts; and (3) explains the assumptions that this Article will be making regarding these issues.
With these preliminary discussions aside, Part II then begins the
Article’s inquiry by describing the concept of “the level that one is
(or was) at” and showing that this notion sits at the core of private
law remedies (as well as being employed across all other areas of
the law). It then explains how the notion is imprecise in various
ways. The first step in identifying the imprecisions is to recognize
that the law’s typical focus on a person’s financial position is merely a proxy for one’s position in terms of happiness (or, perhaps,
some other feature of a person’s welfare that similarly might be
6
thought to be intrinsically valuable). Part II shows that, once the
shift is made to understanding “the level that one is (or was) at” in
terms of happiness, three key imprecisions come to the fore: (1)
how to quantify the happiness level of a moment of experience,
(2) the temporal question of which portion of one’s life—be it
one’s whole life, a temporal chunk thereof (e.g., one’s future), or
single moments—should be the relevant portions of a person’s existence used for determining the position that one was in, is now
in, or will be returned to, and (3) if the relevant portion of one’s
life is a period extended over time that includes more than one
conscious moment, what function to use (be it sum-aggregative,

6. The questions that I address in this Article will be just as relevant and important to
answer even for those who think that things other than happiness have intrinsic value and
that not everything boils down to happiness. Although, going forward, I will explore the issues here through a happiness lens, readers could instead substitute in for happiness another feature of experience that they believe has intrinsic value, and my discussions will have
similar force in that other context. Theorists operating with other accounts of value will confront the same questions that I will be raising here. Thus, this Article’s discussions are equally important for those who do not think that all value boils down to happiness.
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averaging, or something else) to determine the value of the whole,
given the value of its parts.
With respect to each of the identified imprecisions, this Article
assesses (1) whether the law must be more precise or if it can get
by with the current imprecision, (2) if it must be more precise,
which situations require this greater precision, and (3) if the law
requires that the formulations be more precise, what the law’s
more precise formulations should be.
Part II concludes, with respect to the second imprecision, that it
cannot be sidestepped, but it offers a solution to what the question
of what the law’s more precise formulation should be. Part III then
addresses the question of whether the law must be more precise
with respect to the first imprecision, and it argues that it need not
be, and thus that the law is able to sidestep this question.
Ultimately, the bulk of the Article is devoted to exploring the
third imprecision (about which aggregation function to use to determine the value of the temporal whole, once we know—and taking as given—the values of the individual temporal parts), because,
unlike the first imprecision (but like the second), it cannot be
sidestepped, and, unlike the second imprecision, it is extremely
difficult to resolve. The third imprecision is addressed in Part IV.
As Part IV shows, the law does have to address the third imprecision if the law confronts “different-numbers problems”—in short,
cases where two wholes are being compared, the goodness of both
of which is a function of the goodness of their respective parts, but
where the two wholes are made up of a different number of parts.
Further, Part IV argues that the law does in fact confront differentnumbers problems, and that it does so when a person incurs a
harm that shortens his expected future (e.g., among other things,
cases of (1) medical malpractice, (2) torts of exposure to dangerous substances, such as asbestos or smoking, (3) torts of accidents,
such as car accidents or construction accidents, and (4) intentional
7, 8
torts, including but not limited to intentional killings). Thus,
these are cases where the law will need to answer the question of
which aggregation mechanism to espouse.
As will be shown in Part IV, the third imprecision (unlike the
second imprecision) is extremely difficult to satisfactorily resolve. It

7. Or, more generally, when the length of his future is affected either by having it
made longer or shorter. This Article will focus, however, on cases where a person incurs a
harm that shortens his expected future.
8. As already stated, situations where one’s life is shortened by a tort could come in
two stripes: those where the victim is dead at the time of suit and those where the victim is
still alive. This Article focuses primarily on the latter—though the analysis applies to the
former as well if one thinks that plaintiffs should recover for a victim’s harm of lost life-years
even if the victim is already dead.
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is extremely difficult to provide a plausible account of what our aggregation function should be. Said differently, it is extremely difficult to articulate a plausible account of how to value lost years of
life, and this, in large part, is due to the fact that it is extremely difficult to articulate a plausible account of how to trade off quantity
of life against quality of life.
Next, Part V proceeds to explore the law’s treatment of these
cases. It turns out that the law almost as a rule does not allow a person to be compensated in situations where a person is harmed by
having his life shortened—irrespective of whether the victim is
dead or alive at the time of the suit. Prima facie, this suggests that
the law is saying that a person is not harmed by having his life
shortened. Part V explores various practical reasons why we might
not allow a person to be compensated for having his life shortened
even if we do think that he is harmed by having his life shortened
(including, among other things, the fact that victims are often
dead at the time of the suit and thus often unable to be compensated themselves), but Part V concludes that these reasons are not
sufficient for denying compensation across the board to people
who have their lives shortened. Part V thus suggests that courts are
indeed saying that a person who has his life shortened is not
harmed. This, however, is in great tension with commonsense intuitions that having one’s life shortened is one of the most serious
harms that one can incur. If our commonsense intuitions are correct and we are not allowing compensation for what is in fact a serious harm (if not the most serious harm) that a person can incur,
then the law’s rule against compensation for a person whose life is
shortened is an egregious gap in the law that needs to be filled.
Thus, to determine if commonsense intuitions are correct, and
thus whether there in fact is an egregious gap in the law, the next
steps are to explore the questions of (1) whether a person can be
harmed by having his life shortened, (2) if so, how much of a harm
this is, and the related, and, indeed, corresponding, questions of
(3) whether a person should be compensated in tort for having his
life shortened, and (4) if so, how much a person should be compensated for having his life shortened. I explore these topics in
9
depth elsewhere, but provide a brief summary of them here—
sketching out the two key analyses involved in answering these
questions: (1) determining which aggregation mechanism is most
plausible, and (2) converting the answer to the happiness questions into a measure of compensation for the aggrieved person.

9. See, e.g., Michael Pressman, Aggregating Happiness: A Framework for Exploring Compensation for Lost Years of Life, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
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Lastly, in Part VI, the Article considers various extensions and
further implications of the foregoing discussions. Perhaps the most
important of these is as follows: while the number of cases caught
within the net of the discussions of the Article is already significant,
the Article provides reasons to think that, with time and further
development of technology, the number of cases that confront the
issues that this Article grapples with will grow substantially and
precipitously. Thus, though these questions are already of great
importance, their importance will continue to grow. In light of
this, it is all-the-more crucial that we address these questions, and
that we do so as soon as possible.
After addressing this extension as well as the others in Part VI,
the Article concludes.
The contributions that this Article makes are both theoretical
and practical. The theoretical: The discussions and conclusions of
this Article provide analysis and insight in areas where there have
been gaps in legal theory. Noticing that these gaps exist and showing them to the reader is the key first step that this Article carries
out. Second, the Article attempts to provide answers to many of the
questions, and to at least lay the foundations for answers to others.
The theoretical contributions also result in practical contributions. Most important are the practical implications associated with
potential compensation for a person who has his life shortened.
Since the current state of the law—which does not provide for
compensation to a person for his having his life shortened—is in
great tension with commonsense intuition, it may well be in need
of significant changes. These changes would affect private law
remedies and affect the lives of very many people.
Lastly, the goals of this Article can also be described at a higher
level of generality: to bring about a legal system that better furthers
both fairness and efficiency. My hope is that the considerations in
this Article and the changes to the law that they set in motion can
make progress with respect to both fairness and efficiency.
I.

TWO PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS

Part I provides two brief preliminary discussions intended to
clarify what follows. First, it provides descriptions and examples of
different-numbers problems so that the reader can more vividly
grasp the nuts and bolts of different-numbers problems, the issues
they raise, and why they are so difficult to satisfactorily resolve.
Second, Part I (1) provides descriptions and clarifications regarding forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law
(and of private law more generally)—which correspond, respec-
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tively, to the positions of the law-and-economics theorist and of the
corrective-justice theorist; (2) explains the interactions between
the two accounts; and (3) explains the assumptions that this Article
will be making regarding these issues.
A. Numerical Examples of Different-Numbers Problems
Before proceeding further, the following provides examples that
introduce and explain different-numbers problems.
Suppose that the happiness of a life is a function of the happiness of each of the moments of conscious experience that the life
is composed of. Further, let’s make the simplifying assumption that
any particular period of time for any person always contains the
same number of conscious moments. Now consider two examples,
each of which compares the lives of two people.
Example 1: Suppose that Person 1 lives for 100 years and that
each of his conscious moments is of happiness level five. Suppose
that Person 2 also lives for 100 years but that each of his conscious
moments is of happiness level seven. Which life is happier? Which
life would one rather live? Person 2’s life. This is an easy question
to answer, and this is because it involves a “same-numbers” problem. The number of components making up the whole in both of
the states of affairs being compared was the same: 100 years of conscious moments.
A “different-numbers” problem, however, is not always easy to
10
answer. Example 2: Suppose (again) that Person 1 lives for 100
years and that each of his conscious moments is of happiness level
five. Suppose that Person 3 lives for 50 years and that each of his
conscious moments is of happiness level eight. This is a differentnumbers problem, because the comparison is between two wholes
that are composed of a different number of components. Which
life is happier, Person 1’s or Person 3’s? Which life would one rather live? Here, the answer is not obvious. It depends on what aggregation mechanism (i.e., function) one employs for going from
the values of the parts to the value of the whole.
If one uses what I will call total-utilitarianism-type (TU-type) aggregation, the happiness of a life is the sum of the happiness values
for each conscious moment. Thus (if we label a year’s worth of
conscious moments of level x as summing to x units of
11
ness ), Person 1’s life will have a happiness value of 500 (i.e., 5 x
10. See Part IV.B, infra, for a more in-depth discussion of this topic.
11. If we were to be more precise, and if there were, say, one billion conscious moments in a year, then if each moment were at level five, then there would be five billion
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100), whereas Person 3’s life will have a happiness value of 400
(i.e., 8 x 50). If one uses what I will call average-utilitarianism-type
(AU-type) aggregation, the happiness of a life is the average of the
happiness values for each conscious moment, and thus Person 1’s
life will have a happiness value of five, whereas Person 3’s life will
have a happiness value of eight. Thus, our determination of which
life is happier (or better) will be a function of which aggregation
mechanism we employ (because TU says Person 1’s life is happier,
but AU says Person 3’s life is happier).
Importantly, it’s not immediately obvious which aggregation
mechanism is the more plausible one. As this Article will show, although TU-type aggregation and AU-type aggregation both have attractive features, they are both also afflicted by seemingly devastating counterintuitive implications that appear to render each of
them (and their various respective temporal sub-versions, to be de12
scribed later) implausible. Various accounts that are hybrids of
TU-type aggregation and AU-type aggregation also can be offered,
but they too seem to be afflicted by devastating counterintuitive
13
implications. Perhaps one could come up with some other more
plausible option for an aggregation mechanism, but it’s not clear
what other views there might be that do not fit within one of the
categories just described. Thus, not only do different-numbers
problems force us to choose among the various possible aggregation mechanisms, but it’s extremely tricky to articulate a single aggregation mechanism that can satisfactorily handle all cases.
In same-numbers problems, on the other hand, however, we
need not choose between AU-type and TU-type aggregation (or
other, hybrid, theories), because they will always yield the same
comparative assessments between the states of affairs that are being
compared.
As we can now see, different-numbers problems are tricky. However, although different-numbers problems are a problem that philosophers confront, it has not been recognized that they are a
problem that the law also must confront. As far as I can tell, there
has not been a single discussion about different-numbers problems
in the context of the law—not in academic literature, in case law,
or anywhere else. This is concerning, because there are situations

happiness units in the year. Or, if one wants to say that there are five units in the year, then
one could say that what we had called happiness level five was actually happiness level fivedivided-by-one-billion. I’ll opt for the first of these two possibilities here, meaning that the
number I give to a person’s annual total happiness units is actually in, say, billions. This detail does not affect the analysis here, though, so it suffices to employ the simplified terms.
12. See Part IV.B, infra for a more in-depth discussion of this topic.
13. See generally DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 119-41 (1984); Michael Pressman,
A Defence of Average Utilitarianism, 27 UTILITAS 389 (2015).
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in which the law must confront different-numbers problems, and it
is of great importance (1) that we become aware of how and when
the law confronts them and (2) that we come up with a solution
that ensures the law will resolve such situations satisfactorily. This
Article carries out the first task, and it attempts to lay the foundations for the second.
B. Backward-looking and Forward-looking Accounts of Tort Law
(and of Private Law more Generally)
In the Introduction, I wrote that “[a]rguably the entire purpose
private law remedies is to make an aggrieved party whole, or, said
differently, to bring a person back to ‘where he was,’ to ‘the position that he was in,’ or to ‘the level that he was at’ before incurring
the harm that he incurred.” This, indeed, is the lens through
which this Article will proceed, but, before proceeding, it is important to note a wrinkle and to explain the assumptions under
which I will be operating.
The underlying rationales for tort law (and private law, more
generally) ultimately actually fall into two main camps: forwardlooking theories (typically espoused by law-and-economics theo14
rists) and backward-looking theories (espoused, in the context of
15
tort law at least, by corrective-justice theorists). Forward-looking
theories maintain that the law is and should be determined by
what brings about optimal incentives for future actors. Backwardlooking theories maintain that the law is and should be determined by what brings about corrective justice to the harmed parties in any particular case (i.e., what makes these parties whole).
In this Article, I will explore the doctrines in question exclusively
through the backward-looking lens. Doing so is defensible for
three reasons.
First, I have argued elsewhere that, contra popular belief, forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law are entire16
ly compatible and coextensive. Thus, from my perspective, exploring the doctrines in question through the backward-looking

14. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Richard Posner, Wealth
Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT
LAW (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
15. For examples of well-known articulations of corrective justice theory, see JULES
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001); ERNEST WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE (2012);
Jules Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW
53 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992).
16. Michael Pressman, The Compatibility of Forward-Looking and Backward-Looking Accounts
of Tort Law, 15 UNIV. N.H. L. REV. 45 (2016).
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lens also simultaneously satisfies exploring them through a forward-looking lens.
Second, even if my compatibility hypothesis were false, exploring the doctrines in question through a backward-looking lens is
important, because even if the backward-looking lens doesn’t constitute the whole picture of what is relevant, the vast majority of
theorists would think that it constitutes at least (an important) part
of what is relevant to the analysis of whether a private law doctrine
(e.g., a tort doctrine) is good.
Third, even if my compatibility hypothesis were false and one
didn’t think that corrective justice was at all important in and of
itself, I think that the determination of what would make the plaintiff whole is often the key first step in determining what the optimal damages would be from a forward-looking perspective (i.e., in
terms of creating the optimal incentives). While the economist
would likely consider other factors as well, a key component even
of the forward-looking analysis is to quantify the externalities imposed by the behavior that the defendant engages in, and this sum
typically is the amount that it would take to make the plaintiff
whole (i.e., bring him back to the level that he was at before incurring the harm that he incurred).
Additionally, even if each of the three foregoing reasons were not persuasive, the backward-looking framework employed by this Article
would still be an important exploration, albeit one that in that case
would thus not speak to all readers. There are indeed many who
do view the purpose of private law remedies exclusively through a
backward-looking lens, and, for them, exploring the issues through
a backward-looking lens would constitute the whole picture.
For these reasons, this Article will proceed by discussing the issues exclusively through a backward-looking lens and assume that
the purpose of private law remedies is to make a harmed person
whole.
II. THE LAW’S GOAL OF RETURNING A PERSON TO “THE LEVEL THAT
ONE WAS AT,” AND HOW THIS IS AN IMPRECISE NOTION
A. The Notion of “the Level that One Was at” and Its Ubiquity in the Law
A large number of areas of the law employ the notion of “the
level that one was at,” or “the position that one was in” to describe
some aspect (be it financial, happiness-related, or something else)
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of a person’s situation before the occurrence of an event (such as
17,18
This is especially the
an event that causes the person harm).
case in private law areas—including contracts, torts, property, and
unjust enrichment—and, in particular, in private law remedies, but
it is the case in various (and diverse) other areas of law as well, in19
20
cluding, to name just a few, tax law, constitutional law, criminal
21
22
law, and family law.
Within private law, the notion of “the level that one is at” is particularly ubiquitous. Private law areas govern the interactions
among private citizens, and the entire purpose of private law remedies is (arguably, and speaking loosely) to make it the case that a
person who is aggrieved or wronged can have this aggrievance or

17. In many areas (especially in the private law areas), the notion is employed explicitly, though in other areas it is employed implicitly. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Against Fuller
and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 101 (2000); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936).
18. As will be discussed below, in Part II.B, these notions seem to generally be understood to refer to either the financial level that one was at and the financial position that was
in or the happiness level that one was at and the happiness position that one was in. See, e.g.,
Craswell, supra note 17, at 102; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 17, at 54. While there are occasions where it is made clear whether the terms “the level that one was at” and “the position
that one was in” refer to the position and level in “financial” or “happiness” terms, this is
rarely the case. Thus, until Part II.B, below, where I address head-on whether the terms are
meant to refer to “financial” or “happiness” levels and positions, I will simply use the generic
form of the terms—which is how they typically are used. I mention here what the two main
options are for giving content to the “position” and “level,” though, because otherwise it
might be somewhat mysterious what these phrases might be referring to.
19. Virtually all doctrines in tax law are premised on identifying the position a person is
in and then taxing him accordingly. This is apparent from an income tax’s basic premise of
taxing a person based on the level of income he receives, but this is also apparent from other less central doctrines—including, just to name two, rules regarding imputed income and
deductions for medical expenses. See generally Michael Pressman, “The Ability to Pay” in Tax
Law: Clarifying the Concept’s Egalitarian and Utilitarian Justifications and the Interactions Between
the Two, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2018); William Andrews, Personal Deductions in
an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World,
31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979).
20. Among other examples: in order to determine if a plaintiff is the proper party to
bring a matter before a federal court, four requirements must be met, one of which is that
the party must allege and prove that he has been injured. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The inquiry into whether the party has been injured involves,
among other things, a comparison between the position that he was in before the event in
question and the position that he was in after the event in question.
21. Among other examples: many sentencing enhancements for white-collar crimes
involve determinations of how great the losses caused by the defendant were. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2019). These involve
setting as a baseline the position that a victim (be it a person or an entity) was at prior to the
crime, and then comparing this position to the victim’s position after the crime. See id.
22. For the purposes of determining spousal support after a divorce, the law often
strives, in various ways, to put a spouse in the position he or she was in before the divorce. As
one example, California courts base spousal support, in part, on the standard of living established during marriage. Cal. Fam. Code § 4330(a). This standard of living is used as a baseline for the purposes of determining spousal support under the Cal. Fam. Code § 4320(a)
circumstances.
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wrong undone—at least as best as is possible. In other words, the
goal of private law remedies is to put the plaintiff back into the position where he would have been but for the violation of his legal
right. That this is the goal of a remedy can be seen from its etymology: the word “remedy” derives from the Latin “re” (meaning
“again” or “back”) and “medeor (meaning “to heal”), and “medeor” in turn comes from the Proto-Indo-European root “med”
(meaning “take appropriate measure,” “measure,” “heal,” “allot,”
23
or “give”). Thus, very literally, a remedy is something that aims to
measure back or again, or to allot (or give) back or again. Or,
phrased only slightly differently: a remedy, very literally, is something that aims to give a person back what he had, or to put a person back to where he was—back to where he was before one or
more of his legal rights were violated.
Of course, different areas of private law have different subject
matter and different doctrines, and thus remedies in different domains may appear to be quite different. Despite these differences,
however, they all seek to remedy the violation of a right by bringing a party back to where he would have been but for the wrong.
For instance, in contracts, the three typical metrics for damages
for breach of contract are the expectation interest, reliance inter24
est, and restitution interest. While each of these metrics is different, each of them employs the notion of returning a party to the
level that he was at, albeit employing this notion with respect to
different times and different people. Expectation damages and reliance damages focus on the position of the non-breacher, and
they aim to put the non-breacher in the position that he would
have been in given a particular counterfactual situation. With expectation damages, we seek to put the non-breacher in the position he would have been in if the contract had been performed;
with reliance damages, we seek to put the non-breacher in the position he would have been in if the contract had never been en23. See Remedy, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/
remedy#etymonline_v_10401 (last visited Jan 5, 2020).
24. See generally Craswell, supra note 17; Fuller and Perdue, supra note 17. Specific performance is also a remedy used in contract law. Unlike the three damages measures, specific
performance is an equitable remedy, and it simply requires that a breacher do as he had
promised he would. Thus, specific performance does not employ the notion of bringing the
non-breacher back to where he had been before the breach, and thus it also does not employ the notion of “the level that one was at.” To the extent that specific performance is performed, however, and to the extent that there either are no consequential losses or the nonbreacher is compensated for them, specific performance presumably does bring the nonbreacher back to where he had been before the breach, and to the (financial or happiness)
level at which the non-breacher was, because the non-breacher does end up receiving the
very thing he was promised. Thus, specific performance is consistent with the goal of returning a non-breacher to the (financial or happiness) level that he was at before breach, even if
it does not explicitly employ these terms.
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tered into. The restitution interest employs the notion of the “level
that he would have been at” as well, but it tracks this level for the
breacher. With restitution damages, we seek to put the breacher
back at the level at which he would have been if he had not entered into the contract, and the disgorged gains that bring the
breacher back to this level are then transferred to the nonbreacher.
The notion of the level at which one would have been is also a
key notion in torts. According to the corrective justice theory of
torts, the underlying goal of torts is generally to make the ag25
grieved party whole and to compensate him for his losses. Thus,
the goal is to put the aggrieved party in the position that he would
have been in but for the tortious activity of the defendant. Even
economists who deny that corrective justice is the goal—or the
fundamental principle—of tort law will generally recognize that a
collateral benefit of tort law is that it brings an aggrieved party
back to the level that he would have been at but for the tortious
26
behavior.
The notion of the level at which one would have been is also a
key concept employed throughout other private law areas, including property and unjust enrichment. In requiring a party to compensate another party for losses arising due to property claims,
remedies seek to bring the aggrieved party back to the position he
would have been in if not for his property-related harm. In unjust
27
enrichment and restitution cases, too, remedies focus on bringing

25. For examples of well-known articulations of corrective justice theory, see COLEMAN,
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 15; Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, supra
note 15; Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 15; WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note
15.
26. On a different, but related note, for an explanation of why the economist’s account
can be understood to require and employ corrective justice, see Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 201 (1981) (“Once
the concept of corrective justice is given its correct Aristotelian meaning, it becomes possible to show that it is not only compatible with, but required by, the economic theory of
law.”). For my exploration into the long-standing debate between economists and corrective
justice theorists regarding whether tort law is and or should be forward-looking or backwardlooking, and for my argument that the debate rests on a false assumption, see Pressman, supra note 16.
27. While some unjust enrichment and restitution claims arise out of other substantive
areas of private law, there are also some that arguably are free-standing claims. Whether and
the extent to which they constitute their own substantive area of the law has been a topic of
much recent debate. See Richard Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1369 (1994); Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
1465 (1994); Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (2011); Chaim Saiman,
Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the Global Restitution Party, 28 OX. J. LEGAL
STUD. 99 (2008); Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL
INQ. L. 1 (2000).
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the unjustly enriched party back to the position that he would have
been in if not for his having unjustly enriched himself.
Further, there is also a whole body of recent literature about the
alleged asymmetry in the law’s treatment of gains and losses (e.g.
28
torts versus unjust enrichment), and these debates constitute yet
another area that makes use of the notion of “the level that one is
at.” Indeed, without this notion, these debates could not even get
off the ground. All of the quantifications for both torts and unjust
enrichment are determined to be gains or losses with respect to a
particular baseline value. It is taken as a given that there is a baseline level (be it a baseline level of happiness or a baseline financial
position), and the questions raised and addressed in these debates
are about how and why shifts from the baseline brought about by
others can or should be treated similarly or differently.
In addition to these areas of private law employing the notion of
returning an aggrieved party to “the level that the person was at,”
there are also various non-private-law areas that seem to have the
same remedial goal. One such example is the compensation statutes that many states have for people who have been wrongfully
29
convicted and incarcerated. Although some have argued that
these statutes actually can or should track principles of restitu30
tion, the most straightforward way of understanding them is
providing tort-like compensation that seeks to compensate those
who were wrongly incarcerated for the wrongs (and disutility) that
were incurred. To the extent that this is the case—and even to the
extent that principles of restitution explain these statutes—these
statutes invoke the same remedial principle of returning a party
(be it the plaintiff or the government) to the position that the party was in before the harm (or unjust enrichment) occurred. Thus,

28. See generally Richard Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
1369, 1371 (1994) (“It is commonplace in modern discussion to dispute the usefulness of
any line between harm inflicted and benefit conferred and by implication the distinction
between restitution and tort, between, as it were, the harm principle and the benefit principle. Everything is said to turn on the choice of the appropriate baseline by which these calculations are made.”); Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985); Ariel
Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189
(2009).
29. These compensation statutes typically allow exonerees to obtain compensation
without having to file a lawsuit and without having to show that official misconduct caused
the incarceration. See Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory Remedies for the Wrongly
Convicted: What Works, What Doesn’t’ and Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403 (2009). Different
states offer different amounts of compensation (and some states do not have compensation
statutes at all). See, e.g., ALA CODE § 29-2-159(a) (Westlaw through Act 2016-54 of the 2016
Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-84(a) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE. ANN. § 103.052(a) (West, Westlaw through end of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the
84th Leg.).
30. See generally Erik Encarnacion, Why and How to Compensate Exonerees, 114 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 139 (2015).
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these statutes also invoke the notion of “the level that the person
was at.”
In sum, the notion of “the position that one was in” or “the level
that one was at” is ubiquitous in the law. This notion is particularly
prevalent in private law areas, and especially so in private law remedies—the entire purpose of which is arguably to return a party to
the position that he was in or the level that he was at but for a
harm that he incurred. In light of the term’s ubiquity, it will serve
us well to further probe it to ensure that we understand its meaning.
B. “The Level that One Was at” Is a Notion Both in Terms of Money and
Happiness, but the Happiness Version Has Intrinsic Importance and the
Money Version Has Mere Instrumental Importance
Up until now, I have been referring to the remedial notion as
returning a person to the “position he was in” or to the “level he
was at” before the harm. As I will argue, this phrase is vague, imprecise, and under-described in various ways—many of which are
not immediately apparent. One, however, is somewhat more apparent than the rest, though it too typically goes unnoticed: are we
talking about returning a person to the “position he was in” before
the harm in terms of money, happiness, or something else?
After all, on the one hand, it seems that remedies awarded by
courts are typically economic and that the harms for which one
might seek a legal remedy are usually economic. On the other
hand, some harms for which one might seek a legal remedy are
non-economic in nature. These non-economic harms are typically
harms associated with the loss of happiness or the infliction of pain
or suffering. Furthermore, it seems that one’s economic position is
only valuable to the extent that it affects one’s position in terms of
happiness.
In light of the fact that these related but non-identical domains
(money and happiness) both potentially could be a good that “the
position he was in” or “the level he was at” refers to, which is it that
we are after in the law? When the law seeks to use a legal remedy to
return a person to “the position he was in” or “the level he was at,”
is it happiness or money that it has in mind? In short, I think that
the answer is that we are generally referring to money, but that
money is used merely because it is a good proxy for what we actually care about—returning a person to “the position he was in” or
“the level he was at” in terms of happiness.
As a practical matter, we generally speak in economic terms. We
talk about putting a party back into a financial position that he
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would have been in and label the level that a person was at in
terms of his financial position. Further, not only do we label the
position that the person was at in terms of finances, we also determine the amount of the remedy in terms of money. Money is the
currency of our legal system. If someone owes a transfer to a party
that he harmed, we generally require the party that has done the
harming to make the aggrieved party whole by paying money to
the aggrieved party. Furthermore, this is the case even if the harm
done to a person is not only (or at all) financial. Even if the harm
done is more than financial—as perhaps is the case in torts where
there is a claim for pain and suffering or non-economic damages
of this sort—the transfer from the harming party to the harmed
party is still typically made in terms of money.
Money, however, is clearly a mere proxy for what we actually
care about—be it happiness or some other feature of what we experience in life—and even law-and-economics theorists will in al31
most all cases agree to this. After all, money does not have intrinsic value. It has merely instrumental value. Money has value
because of the goods it enables a person to buy, and these goods
are valuable because of how they affect a person’s life. More specifically, these goods are valuable because of how they affect a person’s conscious experiences—e.g., how a person’s happiness is affected. It can be contested that everything of value boils down to
happiness, but this is not an unreasonable or outlandish assumption, and it is one under which I will operate. Furthermore, while
there might be some who do not believe that everything of value
boils down to happiness (perhaps instead maintaining that things
such as health or friendships or things of this nature have intrinsic

31. Even Richard Posner, whose original view was that tort law’s goal is to maximize
wealth—as opposed to happiness or something else that has clear value—has changed his
view over the years. Instead of espousing a view of tort law according to which tort law seeks
to maximize economic efficiency (i.e., maximize wealth), he now espouses a view according
to which tort law seeks to maximize happiness. See Richard Posner, Wealth Maximization and
Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David G.
Owen ed., 1995). In switching to this view, Posner adopted the typical view shared by members of the law and economics movement both then and today. Of course, the fact that Posner previously endorsed a view according to which the goal of tort law is the maximization
of wealth does not necessarily speak to what he viewed as being of intrinsic value and what
he viewed as being of merely instrumental value. After all, one could think that the goal of
tort law is to maximize wealth even if one views wealth (i.e., money) as merely of instrumental value. The fact that one seeks to maximize something in the domain of tort law does not
mean that it is what one seeks to maximize overall, summing over all domains of society and
life. Notwithstanding this, however, the change in Posner’s view about the purpose of tort
law is notable.
As for what constitutes the general position of economists about the value of money, it
seems fair to say that it is a consensus view, even among economists, that money does not
have intrinsic value, but, rather, that it merely has instrumental value. See, e.g., Sunstein &
Posner, supra note 2.
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value), even people in this camp will likely agree that money is not
one of the things that has intrinsic value. And, crucially, the questions that I address in this Article will be just as relevant and important to answer even for those who think that things other than
happiness have intrinsic value and that not everything boils down
to happiness. Thus, although, going forward, I will explore the issues here through a happiness lens, readers could instead substitute in for happiness another feature of experience that they believe has intrinsic value, and my discussions will have similar force
in that other context. Theorists operating with other accounts of
value will confront the same questions that I will be raising here.
Thus, this Article’s discussions are equally important for those who
do not think that all value boils down to happiness. Notwithstanding this, I will continue to carry out my discussions through a happiness lens.
Despite happiness being what we actually care about, we operate
in terms of money because it works better in two respects. First, it
works better for assessing “the level a person was at” and the level
that the person now is at, or described differently, the distance
from a person’s original level that a person was shifted due to having his legal rights violated by someone else. Money works well
both because many—if not most—harms that one can get a legal
remedy for are purely economic harms, and because even for noneconomic harms, money is, in (very) broad strokes, a decent proxy
32
for happiness—even if not in every way. As for why this works just
as well as if not better than assessing the amount of happiness lost
(or the levels of happiness before and after the harm): in cases of
33
pure financial loss, the return to one’s financial position will fully
remedy the loss so a happiness metric would, at best, do equally
well as the financial metric; and in cases where there is non32. Surely, as a general matter, money is not a fantastic proxy for happiness. After all,
except, perhaps, in cases of extreme poverty, we would have very little sense of how happy a
person is by looking at his overall wealth. Despite this, in the context of many types of loss of
happiness due to a harm, it seems that providing money can do a decent job, in broad
strokes, of transferring happiness to a plaintiff. People do generally prefer more money to
less money, and thus we can assume in typical cases that money has value. Thus, typically a
transfer of money will bring about a transfer of happiness to a person, and the correlation
between awards of money and awards of happiness would thus likely be positive. It seems
that money is at least as good of a proxy as anything else that the legal system could use.
33. There are of course important questions that can be asked about whether a party is
truly made whole even when the loss is purely financial and the party is then compensated
for the full financial amount. A party could seemingly still be (and in fact usually still is)
worse off after the whole ordeal, and this could be for various reasons, including, for example, the hassle and stress and time spent in the attempt to get compensated for the loss.
While these are important concerns, I leave these types of concerns aside for the purposes of
simplifying the current discussion. Thus, I assume (counterfactually) that being compensated for a purely financial loss in the amount that was lost would indeed make a party
whole.
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economic loss, while perhaps a happiness metric could be more
tailored to happiness than the monetary proxy, happiness presents
(at least prima facie) various difficulties regarding quantification
(especially in the context of quantifying the happiness level of a
single moment of conscious experience), so the financial proxy
34
seems to be our best bet.
Second, money works better as a currency for transfer. While
perhaps happiness could be transferred in non-monetary ways
from a defendant to a plaintiff, happiness is hard to quantify and
hard to transfer, and money is a tangible thing that can be easily
quantified and easily transferred. Thus, even if money is a proxy
for happiness and thus not perfectly tailored to what we care
about, using it for transfers has important practical benefits.
Despite these good reasons for operating in money, however, it
is important to be clear that money is used as a proxy for happiness. Happiness is what we do and should care about intrinsically.
Thus, while we typically talk in terms of money when we talk about
returning a person to ‘the level that he was at’, what we really want
is to bring a party back to the happiness level that he would have
been at but for the event that harmed him, and what we really want
is for this to be brought about by the defendant transferring a certain amount of happiness back to the plaintiff.
Thus, in sum, “the level that one is at” is a notion both in terms
of money and happiness, but the happiness version has intrinsic
importance and the money version has mere instrumental importance.
C. Ways in Which the Notion of “the Level that One Was at” in
Terms of Happiness Is Imprecise
I’ve said that the goal of private law remedies is to bring a person back to “the position that he was in” or “the level that he was
at,” and since I have established that money is just a proxy for happiness, the goal of private law remedies is to bring a person back to
this position in terms of happiness. Thus, if we want to explore and
understand the notion of “the position that a person was in” or
“the level that one was at,” we must do so in the context of happiness.

34. These “various difficulties regarding quantification (especially in the context of
quantifying the happiness level of a single moment of conscious experience)” that using the
domain of happiness would at least prima facie present—be they true difficulties or not—
will be addressed throughout this Article, but, in particular, in Part III.
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Once we shift gears and focus on understanding this notion in
terms of happiness instead of money, however, it becomes a bit less
clear what the phrase means. In terms of money, it’s fairly clear
what the phrase means. “The financial position that a person is in”
and “the money level that one is at,” while not completely specific,
pretty clearly refer to the amount of money that a person has at the
time in question. Perhaps there could be some questions about
how this financial position should account for things such as expected future income or one’s potential future earning capacity,
but generally speaking, it seems pretty clear how to assess a person’s financial situation: sum up a person’s assets and liabilities
and calculate on net how much money the person owns.
It is much less clear how to understand the notion of “the position that a person is in” and “the level that one is at” in terms of
happiness. This is for three reasons, all of which have to do with
ways in which the phrase is quite under-described, and thus vague.
First, we confront questions about how to quantify and measure
the amount of happiness of a particular moment—both as a theoretical matter and as a practical matter. Second, we confront questions about which moment and perhaps which group of moments are
the ones that we are trying to quantify the happiness of. Third, if it
is a group of moments that we are trying to quantify the happiness of,
there is a question of what aggregation mechanism (i.e., function)
to use to determine the value of the whole, once we know (and taking as given) the values of the individual parts.
1. The First Imprecision: Quantifying the
Happiness at a Particular Moment
If we are going to be talking about a happiness level, it seems
that we will need to be able to articulate a metric for quantifying
happiness and that we will also need some way of identifying what
level of happiness a person is at, using that metric. Articulating the
metric is a theoretical task and identifying what level of happiness a
person is at, using that metric, is a practical task. These two tasks
are related, however. Leaving aside the question of identifying
what level of happiness a person is at, at least for the time being, as
a practical hurdle, we can focus on the theoretical question of articulating a metric for quantifying happiness. What is the unit of
happiness? Supposing we call a unit of happiness a “util,” what is
one util? How much happiness is that? Absent a metric of some
sort that is articulated, it is unclear how we could go about referring to a level of happiness, and it is even less clear how one could
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go about articulating or picking out a particular level of happiness
that one attributes to a particular person at a particular moment.
We seemingly do not currently have a metric for happiness, but
that does not mean that one cannot be articulated. If we are going
to be referring to happiness levels, however, it seems that articulating a metric for quantifying the level of happiness at a particular
moment is something that we probably have to do first.
2. The Second Imprecision: the Temporal Component of the
Account of Happiness Quantification, and a Preliminary Attempt
to Specify the Temporal Component
Even if the first question is answered (i.e., even if we articulate a
metric for quantifying happiness, and even if we solve the practical
problem of how to identify how much happiness a particular person has at a particular time using that metric), there is still a second question about what precisely we mean when we refer to a
person’s happiness level. In particular, there seems to be a key
question of what we mean in terms of the dimension of time. After
all, it seems that a person’s happiness level is a property of a conscious experience at a particular moment of time. In light of this,
we need to be more precise when we say that we want to return a
person to a particular level of happiness.
In saying that we want to return a person to a level of happiness,
what moment in time of a person’s life is the relevant moment for
assessing the level of happiness that a person was at before the
harm? The moment right before the harm occurred? Additionally,
since a level of happiness is a property of a particular moment of
experience, which moment of a person’s life is it that we are trying
to increase the happiness of to match that prior moment? In light
of these questions, it seems that we need to make sense of two
things: (1) the temporal component of the happiness level that a
person was at before the harm, and (2) the temporal component
of the happiness level that we are attempting to bring a person to
(since we obviously cannot go back and change the happiness level
at any moment in the past).
There seem to be various possible answers to these questions
about the temporal nature of the phrase “the happiness level that
one is at,” some of which are the following.
First, as just mentioned, one option would be that we want to return the happiness of a particular moment to what it would have
been if not for the harm. As just stated, however, this option is not
possible because we cannot change the past.
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Second, another option is that we are seeking to increase the
happiness of a particular moment in the future as a remedy for the
harm that occurred to a different moment, which occurred in the
past. There are various ways in which one might attempt to carry
out this option. One might seek to return a person to the happiness level he was at by (1) returning a person’s happiness level at
one particular moment in the future to the level that some past
moment, which was affected by the harm, would have been at but
for the harm, or (2) increasing the happiness of some future moment, above what it otherwise would have been, to compensate for
the harm (i.e., the decrease in happiness) to some past moment as
a result of the harm. It seems pretty clear, however, that neither of
these two ways (or other possible ways) of making sense of bringing
a single future moment to some increased level as a remedy for a
harm (i.e., decrease in happiness) to a single past moment, is what
we are after.
Focusing on a decrease to only single moment and then focusing on an increase to only a single moment, regardless of how this
is carried out, does not seem to fully capture the harms and remedies that we are after. It seems that we need to broaden our temporal focus beyond a single moment and beyond a pair of moments.
In line with my hypothesis that we need to broaden our focus
beyond a moment or a pair of moments, I offer two additional options that capture extended periods of time. First, perhaps we are
seeking to return a person’s happiness level for his whole future to
what it would have been if not for the harm. Second, perhaps we
are seeking to return a person’s happiness level for his whole life
back to what it would have been if not for the harm.
These two temporally extended options seem to be much better
candidates for what we are talking about when we talk about seeking to return a person’s happiness level to what it would have been
if not for the harm. Which one is more plausible? Given that we
can’t change the past, it seems that these two temporal accounts
are quite similar, and they might even be identical for all practical
purposes (i.e., they might give us the same prescriptions in all possible cases). Seemingly, whatever brings a person’s happiness level
for his future back to what it would have been if not for the harm,
will also be what brings a person’s happiness level for his whole life
back to what it would have been if not for the harm. I will discuss
later, in Part V, why this is not quite true, and I will at that time explore differences between the two accounts. For the time being,
however, in light of the great similarity between these two accounts, I will treat them interchangeably. Further, for the sake of
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simplicity, and since we cannot change the past, I will for the time
being refer to both views as the view that considers the “happiness
level one is at” to refer to the happiness level of a person’s future
(and not of his whole life, which would also include his past).
What we seem to care about is the happiness level of a person’s
future. Thus, the current hypothesis under exploration is that what
we mean by returning a person to the happiness level that he
would have been at if not for the harm is: First, we estimate the
happiness level that a person had in store in his future before the
harm occurred. Second, we look at the person’s life where the
harm has occurred and estimate the happiness level that the person now has in store for his future. We then seek to return the
happiness level of the person’s future in the second case to the
happiness level of the person’s future in the first case, and we seek
to do so by adding an amount of happiness to the person’s future
in the second case that will bring about the result that the happiness level of the future in the second case is equally as good as the
happiness level of the person’s future in the first case.
Before continuing this discussion, I now offer a brief aside about
money and how this second imprecision that I’ve stated affects an
account of happiness (regarding the temporal component of the
analysis of “the level that a person is at”) in fact does apply to that
analysis in the context of money as well.
3. An Aside About How the Imprecision Regarding the Temporal
Component Also Applies to an Account of “the Level that One Was
at” in Terms of Money
a. A Similarity Between Happiness and Money with
Respect to the Temporal Component
Recall that, in the context of money (unlike in the context of
happiness), it seems fairly easy to make sense of the notion of “returning a person to the level that he was at.” As I stated, it seems
that in the context of money we can simply calculate a person’s financial position or “level” by summing his assets and liabilities and
coming to a net sum of money that he has, and it seems that this
constitutes the financial position or “level” that the person is at. Interestingly, however, upon further examination, it seems that the
temporal characterization of what we actually mean by the phrase
“returning a person to the happiness level that he was at” (i.e., referring to the happiness level of one’s whole future) is a characterization that symmetrically would apply to the phrase in the finan-
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cial context. Just as in the context of happiness what we seem to
care about is one’s happiness going forward, it seems that what we
care about in the financial context is one’s financial capability going forward. Although it does seem that happiness and money are
symmetrical in this case, I don’t think that this means that I was
wrong to say that the financial context could (generally) be calculated by looking at how much money a person has in the present.
It seems that a person’s financial capability for his future consists
of future income plus his current amount of money owned. Further, for many financial harms, it is one’s currently possessed money that is depleted. Thus, it seems that in most cases a person can
be returned to the financial position that he was at (which I’m now
saying we should understand as his financial position for his future)
by merely returning his currently possessed money to the amount
that it would have been if not for the harm.
While the focus of the following discussions will be happiness
and not money, it is important to have clarified that in both contexts, when we talk about the notion in remedies of “returning a
person to the position he was in” or “returning a person to the level he was at,” this refers to making it the case that we are attempting to provide the person with a whole future of the same level of
money or happiness that he would have had if not for the harm incurred.
It’s also important to be clear that I’m not saying that the ubiquitous remedial notion of “returning a person to the position he
was in” or “returning a person to the level he was at” is mistaken.
It’s not. It’s just that it is a somewhat misleading term if one does
not realize that it is shorthand. The goal of providing a remedy
seems to be not exactly returning a person to the level that a person was at before the harm, but, rather, returning the level (be it in
terms of happiness or money) of a person’s expected future after the
harm to the level of the person’s expected future before the harm was
incurred. This important clarification not only will pave the way for
the discussions and findings later in this Article, but it is also worth
taking note of in its own right.
b. A Difference Between Happiness and Money with Respect to the
Temporal Component, and the Beginnings of a Lead-in to the
Third Imprecision Regarding Happiness
Despite the fact that it seems that what we care about in both the
money and happiness contexts is one’s future, there is an important difference between money and happiness (and identifying
this difference also begins to put us on notice about something re-
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lated to the third imprecision in the context of happiness; it thus
serves as a bit of a lead-in to that topic). We can seemingly calculate a person’s financial position for the future by looking primarily at the present moment, whereas we cannot do this for happiness.
(I’ve said that in the context of money we also must consider future income and expenses etc., but, leaving that aspect aside, looking at a person’s current net financial assets will dictate how much
money a person has for his future.) The inquiry into happiness,
however, does not admit of the short cut of looking primarily at
the present and determining how much happiness a person currently possesses that can be used as a store of happiness to be distributed over one’s future years. The difference is that the money
that a person will spend in his future can be possessed by the person now in the present, whereas the happiness that a person will
experience in his future is not in any sense possessed by the person
now in the present. Money can be collected and possessed before it
35
is spent, but happiness does not have an analogous feature.
Leaving behind this subection’s aside regarding money, however, I now return to the discussion of happiness and the hypothesis
that the goal of a remedy is to provide a person with a future of the
same happiness level that his future would have had if not for the
harm incurred.

35. While I think that the clarification that I’ve made about the “level a person is at”
even in the money context is one that should be understood as one that applies temporally
to one’s future, I think that the observations in this paragraph about how current money
(unlike happiness) can serve as a store for future spending helps perhaps explain what
might have led to our typically using the shorthand that we do use in the context of money.
Since the money that we possess at a single moment can actually represent the money that
one will be able to spend in the future (or at least some portion of it, which in some cases
might be a large portion of it), this means that in the money context there is less of a difference between one’s situation for a single moment and one’s situation for one’s future.
Therefore, in the money context (but not in the happiness context), there is good reason
for using one’s “financial position in the current moment” as shorthand for one’s “financial
position for the future.” These notions are more closely tied together than my discussion
might have made them seem, and the shorthand can be understood even if it is interpreted
literally and not interpreted as shorthand. Because of the differences between money and
happiness discussed in the textual paragraph that this footnote accompanies, however, using
the current happiness level to refer to one’s future happiness level is a maneuver that does
not make sense unless one understands it purely as shorthand. It is this difference between
money and happiness that originally led me above, in Part II.C.1, to state that while understanding the notion of the “the level that one was at” in terms of money is straightforward
enough, it is much less clear how to understand this notion in the context of happiness,
and, in particular, this is because the notion in the context of happiness is under-described
and thus vague in various ways—three of which I have been and will be describing in Part II
of this Article.
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4. The Third Imprecision: The Existence of Different Possible
Ways to Aggregate the Happiness of Component Moments to
Determine the Happiness of a Temporal Chunk of Moments
I’ve argued that the notion of “the level of happiness that one
was at” is vague and under-described in two ways. First, we have not
yet articulated a metric for quantifying happiness. Second, even if
we were to articulate a metric for quantifying happiness, I argued
that the notion of “the level of happiness that one was at” is vague
and under-described because it did not articulate the temporal
context that it applies to. In this past subection, however, I argued
that the temporal context that we have in mind is a person’s future.
While this notion of bringing a person’s happiness for the remainder of his life to the level that it would have been at if not for
the harm seems like a straightforward notion, even this notion is
not as precise as it might seem. Even if we have articulated a metric
for quantifying happiness and even if we have determined that the
relevant temporal context is the remainder of a person’s life, the
notion of a person’s happiness level is still under-described.
Given the happiness level of a particular moment, and given the
decision about which group of moments are the relevant ones (i.e.,
all of those in a person’s future), we still have a question of what
our aggregation mechanism or function is for assessing the value
of the whole (i.e., the remainder of the person’s life) given the
value of the parts (i.e., the values of each of the moments in the
remainder of the person’s life). In other words, even assuming we
have a way to quantify happiness at a particular moment, and even
if we know which moments are the ones that are relevant, there is a
question of what the best way is to quantify the happiness of a temporal chunk of life that includes many moments. How do we aggregate the happiness of the moments when assessing the happiness of a chunk of time that is composed of many moments? This
type of a decision about how to determine the value of a whole always has to be made when one is trying to determine the value of a
whole but one only has, as inputs, the values of the parts.
There are various aggregation mechanisms or methods that
could be used. Perhaps the most straightforward option would be
to use TU-type aggregation, which employs sum aggregation. According to this aggregation method, the value of a portion of a life
is equal to the sum of the units of happiness that one experiences
at each moment during the portion of life in question. Another
option, however, would be to use AU-type aggregation. According
to this aggregation method, the value of a portion of a life is equal
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to the average of the values of units of happiness that one experiences at each moment during the portion of life in question. Hybrid combinations of AU-type aggregation and TU-type aggregation provide further possibilities. Further still, there might be some
alternative functions for going from the value of the parts to the
value of the whole that are neither AU-type aggregation, TU-type
aggregation, nor even a hybrid of these two aggregation types.
Perhaps some other function could be used.
In light of these different options, even if we have a metric for
quantifying happiness at a particular moment, and even if we are
operating within a framework of having a “person’s happiness level” refer to the temporal period that includes the remainder of a
person’s life (which itself was not an obvious or foregone conclusion), it still would not be completely clear how one would quantify
the happiness level of the remainder of one’s life. There are different options for what should be one’s aggregation function, and
it is not obvious which is the correct one.
If, however, we are to have a sound theory of returning a person
to the level he was at, it seems that we must answer all the questions I have raised, including the last one regarding which aggregation mechanism to choose. We seemingly cannot merely use vague
terms and let our analysis stop there. It seems that we must be
more precise: It seems that we must have an account that explains
precisely what it is that we mean when we say “the level that a person was at.”
D. Despite the Imprecision in the Account of Happiness Quantification,
Private Law Remedies Appear to Still Do Just Fine and
Get the Right Results
If we are to have a coherent account of “the level that a person
was at,” it seems that we need to answer the questions that I raised
above. Further, as I say, it seems that a more precise account has
not been offered. Despite this, however, it seems that the law might
be doing just fine. Why is this? How is the law able to provide remedies that seem to bring a person back to the “position that he was
in” or “the level that he was at” if these terms are vague, underdescribed, and lacking content?
It seems that the answer is that, in typical cases, we do not need
to have a more precise theory in the ways I say we should, and this
is because the choice of which more precise theory to offer does
not have a bearing on the result in most cases. In other words, all
of the more precise theories would prescribe the same result in
most cases, and thus it does not seem to matter which of the more
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precise theories we espouse. Further, it seems that it is this very
fact—that the choice of a more precise theory seemingly does not
affect our prescriptions—that has made it the case that we have not
articulated a more precise theory. Cases don’t seem to require that
we be more precise, and if we aren’t required to be more precise, it
is both the case that (1) we might not realize that there is some
lingering vagueness, and (2) even if we were to notice the lingering vagueness, we might not feel the need to put in the effort to be
more precise than we need to be.
So how and why is it the case that there seemingly is usually no
need to be more precise with our theory, and how is it the case that
all of our potential theories would seemingly yield the same prescriptions in most cases? I will now show why this is the case.
1. Cases of Economic (Financial) Loss
The most typical cases (be they in contract, tort, or some other
area in private law) involve a person suffering a harm that is purely
economic—a financial loss. If a person’s losses are merely financial, it seems that being compensated financially in the amount of
the financial loss will put the person back to the happiness level he
was originally at, regardless of which precise happiness theory we
36
use. This seems to be the case even though we do not even attempt to articulate a theory in terms of happiness (much less, a
theory of happiness that is fully specific in the ways that I’ve discussed in the previous sections). Further, this seems to be the case
even though we do not attempt to articulate (1) what the happiness level of the person was before the loss, (2) the happiness level
of the person after the loss, or (3) the amount of happiness lost.
Consider, for example, a car with a suitcase in it. Suppose that
the suitcase is removed from the car, but we then want to return
the car to the weight it was when it contained the suitcase. In order
to do so, we need not necessarily know the pre-removal weight of
the car, the post-removal weight of the car, or even the weight of

36. There are of course questions that can be asked about whether a party is truly made
whole even when the loss is purely financial and the party is then compensated for the full
financial amount. A party could still be (and in fact usually still is) worse off after the whole
ordeal, and this could be for various reasons, including, for example, the hassle and stress
and time spent in the attempt to get compensated for the loss (and, perhaps most significantly, the large portion of a plaintiff’s judgment that goes to the plaintiff’s attorney!).
While these all are very important concerns, I leave these types of practical concerns aside
for the purposes of the current discussion. While these concerns are very real, they are orthogonal to and do not bear on the topic being discussed here. Thus, I assume (counterfactually) that being compensated for a purely financial loss in the amount that was lost would
indeed make a party whole.
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the suitcase. Instead, we can avoid inquiries into these amounts by
either putting the suitcase itself back in the car, or by putting
something in the car that we have deemed to be of equal weight to
the suitcase. (We could in various ways deem something to be the
same weight of the suitcase without knowing what this weight is.
Among these methods would be putting the suitcase and the new
object on a balance to determine that they are the same weight—
whatever weight that might be.)
Thus, in cases where the loss is only financial, it seems that any
happiness theory that we might espouse would yield the same prescriptions. And regardless of which theory we espouse, giving the
aggrieved party the money that he lost would bring the party back
to the level of happiness at which he had been prior to incurring
the loss.
2. Cases of Non-Economic Harms
(e.g., damages for pain and suffering)
Not all cases have losses limited to financial losses, however.
Some tort cases, for example, involve claims for non-economic
damages such as pain and suffering (be these the only claims in a
37
case or be they in addition to claims for financial losses). Perhaps,
one might think, these cases would require us to articulate an account of “the level that one was at” in terms of happiness—and
perhaps even an account of happiness quantification that is fully
specific in the ways that I’ve discussed in the previous Section.
While it might seem prima facie as though this is the case, I do not
think that it is in fact the case. Just as with the cases where losses
are only financial, cases of non-economic harms do not seem to
require us to choose among the theories of happiness quantification.
The difference between the case of non-economic damages and
the case of economic damages is that in the economic case the loss
has already been quantified in terms of money, whereas in the
non-economic case it has not. But this, however, does not mean
that we are confronted with any of the questions I’ve discussed

37. It is of course also the case, however, that even cases of straightforward financial
loss might in fact involve a loss of happiness more than simply the lost funds. After all, it
seems ceteris paribus preferable never to lose one’s money than to lose it and be refunded
later, especially in light of the fact that this might take considerable time as well as involvement in legal proceedings. Notwithstanding this important practical wrinkle, I will assume,
for the purposes of my discussion, that the compensatory sums in purely financial cases do
indeed make a party whole and also that the compensatory sums here in cases of noneconomic damages also do indeed make a party whole.
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above in terms of articulating a theory of happiness and in terms of
how to precisify the theory of happiness. We need not articulate a
theory of how to articulate or quantify happiness at a particular
moment, and we also need not articulate a theory of how to quantify the happiness of a period of time consisting of many moments
once we have happiness values for each of the time-period’s component moments. The reason that we do not need to articulate
these things is that we need not articulate (1) what the person’s
happiness level was before the loss, (2) what the person’s happiness level was after the loss, or (3) how much happiness was lost.
Why is this? This is for the same reasons as in the purely economic case, and as illustrated by the example of the car and the
suitcase in that context. Here, we need only figure out what the
38
monetary value of the lost happiness is. (In the context of money,
we needed only figure out how much money was lost, or to put it in
a parallel—but more awkward—form: In the context of money, we
needed only figure out what the monetary value of the lost money
was.) Since the damages measure is an economic one even in the
case of non-economic harms, we need only determine how much
money it will take to bring the person back to the happiness level
that he was at (or, similarly, how much money it will take to bring
the person the amount of happiness that he had lost). We need
not articulate how many units of happiness this happiness transfer
amounts to, and we also need not articulate what levels of happiness the person was at before and or after the loss.
Interestingly, even if the remedy in court were non-financial and
amounted somehow to a transfer of happiness in some other way,
it might still be that we could avoid the various above questions. It
could be that we would then simply need to somehow do something akin to putting the happiness loss on one side of a balance
(i.e., a “happiness balance”) and figure out what would even the
balance if it were put on the other side, and then give the plaintiff
whatever this is. There are further questions about whether a maneuver of this sort actually would amount to determining a measure of happiness and thus determining what amount of happiness
was lost (because it is not immediately obvious what would consti-

38. For the purposes of this discussion, the “we” who is figuring out the monetary value
of the lost happiness could be anyone. It is meant to refer to anybody at all who attempts to
estimate how much money the correct amount is. For example, an estimate of this sort
could be made by the aggrieved party himself, by the courts, or by anybody else whatsoever.
Of course, the more that a person knows about the facts of the situation and about the facts
about the aggrieved party, the more likely that it probably is for one’s estimate to be accurate. For further discussion about questions related to how this estimate of the correct compensation amount is made, see Part V, infra. For further discussion about questions related
to who should be making this estimate for the purposes of private law, see Part V, infra.
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tute the determination of a happiness measure, and the balancing
maneuver just mentioned very well might implicitly amount to the
determination of a happiness measure), but I will leave these further questions aside here.
In sum, even in cases of non-economic harms, despite it perhaps
seeming as though we might need to articulate an account of happiness (and perhaps even an account of happiness that is precise in
the ways discussed in the previous Sections), it turns out that we
can avoid these questions. The only way in which cases of noneconomic harms differ from cases of economic harms is that they
require us to determine what the financial equivalent is, for an aggrieved party, of the non-economic loss in the case. This may not
be an easy determination to make, but it nevertheless does not
confront any of the further questions associated with happiness
quantification.
E. Summary
The law employs the notion of returning a person back to the
“position that he was in” or “the level that he was at,” but I have argued that these terms are vague, under-described, and lacking content. Despite these notions not having specific meanings, however,
it seems that courts are still able to do just fine as is. They are seemingly able to successfully bring it about that parties are brought
back to the “position that he was in” or “the level that he was at.”
How is it that the courts are able to pull off this magic trick and
bring it about that parties are brought back to the “position that he
was in” while avoiding the underlying questions of how to articulate a coherent account of these notions? As the above discussion
has shown, the law seemingly can avoid these underlying questions
because the choice of which more precise theory to offer does not
seem to have a bearing on the result in most cases. In other words,
all the more precise theories seemingly would prescribe the same
result in most cases, and thus it does not seem to matter which of
39
the more precise theories we espouse.
39. Although I will argue later in this Section and in the remainder of the Article that
we (i.e., the law) cannot, after all, avoid answering all of the questions about how to precisify
our account of happiness and of the “the level that a person was at,” at this point I am arguing that it certainly seems prima facie (and even after giving the topics here some thought)
that we can avoid answering the questions about how to precisify our accounts, and this
seemingly is because all of the more precise accounts we might have seemingly would not
affect any prescriptions. They would yield the same results in all situations, and thus, there’s
a sense in which it seems as though the differences between the various possible more precise accounts are smoothed over, like with a blanket of snow, obscuring and removing all
differences that existed between the various sub-accounts and thus removing any need to

630

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:3

Despite these findings, however, the underlying questions remain, and three types of thoughts come to mind regarding them.
First, a theoretical account of the underlying questions is valuable
and interesting in itself. How do we measure and quantify happiness—in the moment and over time? Second, could it really be that
the law can adequately return someone to the “level that they were
at” prior to a harm, without knowing either the magnitude or the

choose which precise account to espouse. It seems that money is smoothing over any differences between happiness theories (i.e., differences with respect to how to quantify the happiness of a moment, and also differences regarding temporal questions, and further, it
could even maybe seem as though money can smooth over AU and TU even in the context
of different-numbers cases). As discussed in the suitcase example, above, it seems that one
can simply figure out how much money to give a plaintiff and that by focusing on money in
this way we can smooth over the happiness questions.
One might think at this point, though, that there indeed is a context, similar to those
that I’ve been discussing, that might avoid this smoothing over, and this context is the context of gains (i.e., benefits), as opposed to losses (i.e., harms). Or, to put it this into the category of a private law topic, this is the context of unjust enrichment. It might seem that the
context of returning a person back down to the level he was at rather than returning a person
back up to the level he was at would avoid the smoothing effect. It might seem as though the
gain to a person’s happiness due to, say, hearing a free violin concert in the subway, is something that, unlike a harm, would have to be quantified in an amount of happiness that was
gained and we thus could not sidestep the question of how to quantify happiness—whereas
a harm (of, say, having one’s car stolen) would be able to sidestep the happiness by just employing money values.
Although it might seem as though the context of gains (and unjust enrichment) might
be relevantly different from the context of harms and might thus require us to confront the
happiness questions, this is not the case. The mistake was to compare a case of noneconomic gains to a case of economic losses. Both gains and losses, when appropriately
compared, are the same for the purposes of this discussion. Both gains and losses can be in
economic values or in non-economic values. Cases of economic gains and losses allow the
same smoothing over as each other (and as discussed in the first illustration of the suitcase
example). So too, cases of non-economic gains and losses allow the same smoothing over as
each other, and, as discussed in the second illustration of the suitcase example, noneconomic cases involve smoothing over of the happiness questions just as the economic cases do. The difference is that in the economic cases we just give the amount of money lost
back, whereas in the non-economic cases we have to put on one side of a balance the happiness or unhappiness that was caused by the event, and on the other side, an amount of
money to be given or taken (depending on whether it’s a gain or loss) that will cause happiness or unhappiness that balances the scale. As discussed in the second instance of the suitcase example, though, non-economic cases still allow us to sidestep the happiness questions,
because we do not need to do anything to quantify the happiness in any way. Instead, what
we do is simply put the happiness or unhappiness on a balance to see what amount of money it seems to be equivalent to.
Importantly, however, all of the above analysis applies just as much to the context of
gains (or benefits) as it does to losses (or harms). Thus, even if it might have seemed as
though the context of gains would force us to confront questions about happiness that we
could sidestep in the context of losses, this is a mistake. We seemingly can still sidestep these
questions in both contexts.
Although I conclude here that the context of gains is not an area that prevents us from
sidestepping all of the happiness questions, and it thus seems that we still might be able to
sidestep them all, as I explain later in this Section and throughout the remainder of the Article as a whole, it turns out that there indeed is a context that prevents us from being able
to sidestep all of the questions. It’s just that this context is not the context floated in this
footnote (i.e., gains)—though, the context I will say does prevent us from sidestepping all of
the questions could apply in the context of gains, just as it could in the context of losses.
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harm or the “level they were at” prior to that harm? After all, it is an
understatement to say that the conjunction of the following claims
is a bit mysterious: (1) in providing remedies, we seek to bring a
person back to the happiness level that he was at before the harm
was incurred, yet (2) we are unable to articulate or quantify what
happiness level a person was at before the harm was incurred, and
(3) we are unable to articulate or quantify how much happiness a
person lost due to the harm incurred. Third, it seems that even if
the law could avoid answering these questions in most cases, perhaps there could be cases where it must confront them.
As I will now show, there indeed is an important set of cases
where the law indeed must confront these theoretical questions.
Three underlying imprecisions about the notion of “the level of
happiness that one is at” have so far been identified: (1) imprecision regarding quantifying happiness at a particular moment, (2)
imprecision regarding the temporal component of quantifying
happiness, and (3) imprecision regarding which aggregation
mechanism to employ for quantifying the happiness of a period of
time composed of component moments (if the time-period in
question is composed of more than just a single moment). Going
forward, I proceed as follows with respect to these three questions.
I assume that the answer to the temporal question (imprecision
number two) is that what we care about is the level of happiness in
a person’s future. I will in Part V, scale back this assumption and
probe the temporal question further. Until then, though, I will assume that the answer to the temporal question is that what we care
about is the happiness level of a person’s future.
Part III addresses imprecision number one (which is about
quantifying happiness at a particular moment). It concludes that,
even after a substantive exploration of the topic (i.e., even after an
exploration that is more in-depth than the brief introduction in
Part II), the law seemingly can avoid this question. This is because
(a) a metric for quantifying happiness at a moment can be articulated, and (b) all metrics seemingly provide the same prescriptions.
This question about whether the law can avoid imprecision number one does get revisited in Part V in a circumscribed discussion,
but Part III constitutes my general conclusion on the matter.
Part IV then addresses imprecision number three (regarding
aggregation mechanisms). I conclude that law cannot avoid answering this question, because there are cases where our choice of aggregation mechanism will affect our prescriptions. This conclusion then
paves the way for the analysis in the later Parts in this Article.
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III. WHY WE DO NOT NEED TO SETTLE ON A PRECISE METRIC FOR
QUANTIFYING HAPPINESS AT A PARTICULAR MOMENT: I.E.,
WHY OUR CHOICE OF A METRIC DOES NOT AFFECT
OUR PRESCRIPTIONS IN THE LAW
Here in Part III, I address the question of how to quantify the
happiness level at a particular moment. More specifically, I address
whether the law can in fact avoid addressing this question, as it
seemed in Part II that the law might. It turns out that the law can
avoid this question. This is because: (1) despite the fact that we as a
society do not have a commonly used metric for quantifying the
happiness of a moment of experience, this does not pose a problem for the law because we can in fact articulate a metric to quantify the happiness of a moment of experience, and (2) not only does
the lack of a metric not pose a problem for the law, but it turns out
that we do not need to articulate any specific metric, because it
doesn’t matter for the purpose of any prescriptions or assessments
which metric we adopt. The results would be the same regardless
of which metric we choose to employ.
Thus, for these reasons, the law can avoid addressing the question of how to quantify happiness at a particular moment.
A. Articulating a Metric (i.e., Unit) for Measuring Happiness Can Be
Done and It Is Not Importantly Different from Articulating a Metric for
Physical Properties Like Length and Mass
While it might initially seem different, the task of defining a
metric (i.e., a unit) for quantifying the happiness level of a particular moment is in many ways the same as the task of defining a metric for quantifying any other property, such as mass or length. In
each of these cases, the initial choice of a unit to be used to measure the property is arbitrary.
Supposing, for example, that the “foot” was the first unit of
length, if one were to ask how long a “foot” was, one could do
nothing other than point to the physical object (perhaps King
George’s left foot) that was used as the benchmark for this quantity. This choice of the length of the unit (and the name of the unit)
would be arbitrary, and all other quantities of length would be
made in terms of relativistic statements making comparisons to this
unit (for example, a mile is equal to 5,280 feet).
This is precisely the same type of endeavor that could be used to
define a unit of happiness. For example, I could have a sip of juice
and then define the happiness of this sip of juice (and perhaps the
“typical sip of juice”) as the unit for happiness—namely what I am
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experiencing when I have this “typical sip of juice.” Just as with the
unit for length, the unit for happiness is arbitrary. And just as is the
case with length, one can then make comparisons between quantities of the property (be it lengths or be it happiness) and introduce
new units in statements relative to the arbitrary unit. For example,
one could say that the steak meal one had was “equal to seven ‘sips
of typical juice.’” One could even then define a unit called “the
typical steak meal” as being equal to seven “sips of typical juice.”
Of course, there are important ways in which defining a unit of
happiness (as, for example, a “typical sip of juice”) is different
from defining a unit of length (as, for example, a foot). One such
difference relates to the observability of the quantities in question,
and the other (related) difference relates to how assessments comparing relative quantities are made, and I’ll mention both in turn.
The difference relating to observability of the quantities in question has two components, an interpersonal one and an intrapersonal one.
With assessments of length, a person can easily demonstrate the
length of something to someone else by visually showing how the
length of the object compares to the length of a benchmark. For
example, one can place a ruler next to a piece of paper to show
that the length of one of the sides is eleven inches. This enables
another person to observe that the side is eleven inches. Not all
measurements of length would be as simply demonstrated as this,
but demonstrations of length are similar in how they can be observed by a second person. If, on the other hand, I say that the experience I just had was “eleven typical sips of juice” of happiness,
there does not seem to be any analogous way for someone other
than myself to observe or verify this.
Further, this difference between measurements of happiness
and of length does not only apply to the gap between one person
and another person—it also applies to the gap within a single person, between the person at one time and the same person at a later
time. If a person, in year one, measures a table and determines
that it is nine feet long, this same person can observe again in year
two the determination that was made in year one. If, however, a
person makes a happiness measurement of his experience of a particular meal on an evening in year one, there does not seem to be a
way that even this same person can re-observe this assessment in
year two. The person in year two may of course remember the experience that he had had in year one, but this would not constitute
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a direct observation of the experience in year one. Thus, not only
are there differences between the observation of measurements of
length and of happiness in an interpersonal context, but there also
are differences between measurements of length and of happiness
in an intrapersonal context.
There is another way in which measurements of length and
measurements of happiness are different, and it relates to the ways
(discussed in the foregoing paragraphs) in which there are differences in the context of observability. This additional difference
concerns how assessments comparing relative quantities are made.
In the context of length, suppose that we have already defined the
basic unit as the “foot.” We can then determine that something is
three feet long if it is equal in length to an object that consists of
three one-foot-long objects that are placed one after each other
length-wise with the objects flush against each other. Thus, with
length, we can determine how many feet long an object is by essentially stacking objects of shorter lengths together and adding up
the lengths of the shorter objects to determine the length of the
longer object. In the context of happiness, however, while perhaps
this can be done, it is much less clear how this works. Certainly,
there is no physical placing of one experience spatially next to another. Perhaps the experiences are somehow hypothetically superimposed. How this is done is an interesting question and it is far
from clear. This is not to say that it cannot be done in the happiness context, though. Surely it can be done, and surely it is done
all the time. After all, we engage in practical reasoning and decision making all the time that show that we can weigh the relative
goodness of experiences. We at the very least can see this from revealed preference, but there is also no reason to think that we cannot also make the comparisons about happiness experiences themselves. It is clear that we do make these comparative assessments.
How exactly these comparative assessments are made, though, is
not completely clear, and it seems that even if we use a mechanism
that bears analogies to the mechanism in the context of length, it
will be a mechanism that is quite different.
Despite the clear differences between the measurement of
length and the possible measurement of happiness, there are also
key similarities. Importantly for our purposes, there is no reason to
think that we cannot articulate a metric for quantifying happiness
or that happiness cannot be quantified. Although properties like
length and happiness have key differences, they still are similar in
40. Many interesting questions arise in the context of intrapersonal comparisons and of
memory of past experiences, but these are beyond the scope of this Article, so I will leave
them aside here.
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that a similar approach can be used to provide a metric for quantifying them.
Despite the fact that there is no theoretical difficulty with articulating a metric for quantifying happiness, this does not mean that
there are no challenges practically. Various difficulties exist in explaining or showing, even to oneself, what one “sip of typical juice”
of happiness is, and this provides us with difficulties not only with
conveying to oneself or others how much happiness an experience
had, but it also makes it particularly difficult to attempt to make assessments of the quantities of happiness being experienced by other people—whose conscious experience we do not and never did
have access to. Despite these being difficulties, however, these difficulties are mere practical difficulties. They, at least at the time be41
ing, might make the unit of happiness one that is not as useful as
we might like, but these difficulties do not make it the case that we
42
are unable to define a unit of happiness. While we do not cur43
rently in our society have any single commonly used or wellestablished metric for quantifying happiness at a particular moment (as we do in fact have for properties like length), there is no
theoretical reason why we cannot create and develop a single
commonly used and well-established metric. The obstacles are only
44
practical.
41. It seems quite likely that our (practical) ability to quantify happiness will drastically
improve with technological developments in the years to come.
42. Interesting further questions abound, but the current discussion will have to suffice
for the purposes of this Article.
43. Although the United States does not have a single commonly used or wellestablished metric for quantifying happiness, some other countries do employ metrics for
quantifying happiness. Consider, for example, Bhutan. Bhutan employs a notion called
“gross national happiness,” instead of the economic indicator “gross national product,” and
the details of how the “gross national happiness” metric works are readily accessible online.
See GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS COMMISSION, https://www.gnhc.gov.bt/en/ (last visited Feb.
14, 2020). Bhutan’s system does not purport to quantify happiness at a particular moment,
and in that sense it differs from the type of metrics I am discussing in this Article. Notwithstanding this difference, however, Bhutan’s system is still a metric for quantifying happiness.
Further, we could extrapolate from Bhutan’s system to articulate a version of that system
that does boil down to a metric that quantifies happiness at particular moments.
44. Some people might disagree with me on this point. For example, some are of the
view that not all experiences necessarily are commensurable in terms of their goodness level
or happiness level. For example, some might think that the experience of listening to Bach
is different in kind and not just in magnitude from the experience of having a sip of juice,
and thus there is no single happiness scale by which we can measure experiences. Many philosophers, including John Stuart Mill and James Griffin, have espoused positions of this sort.
See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL (J. B.
Schneewind & Dale E. Miller eds., 2002), JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING,
MEASUREMENT AND MORAL IMPORTANCE (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). In my view, however, even if certain experiences might appear, prima facie, to be incommensurable in terms
of goodness or happiness, they can indeed still be compared and a single scale can indeed
be implemented. In my view, we can infer commensurability and a single scale by appealing
to revealed preference—observing people’s choices when confronted with choices among
the allegedly incommensurable experiences.
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B. We Need Not Articulate a Metric for Quantifying Happiness of a
Moment, Because Regardless of What Metric We Choose,
Our Prescriptions Will Not Be Affected
Not only was it a key a point that we can in fact articulate a metric for measuring the happiness of a particular moment, but there
is a second key point.
What matters for our purposes is simply that a metric can be articulated. We do not need to actually articulate any particular metric for happiness. The reason for this is that, regardless of what the
45
metric is, we seemingly will have the same prescriptions. The prescriptions will be the same both for questions related to quantifying the happiness in a particular moment and for questions related
to quantifying happiness in a period of a person’s life that is composed of component moments. Therefore, and importantly for our
purposes, the prescriptions will be the same for questions addressed in private law remedies, and the choice of which metric to
use will not affect prescriptions in any direction. It does not matter
what the unit is that is used for happiness in a given moment.
The reason for why the choice of unit does not matter—and for
why only the fact that a unit can be articulated is what matters for
these questions—can be seen by exploring a property such as
length. Our reason for why we need not articulate a unit and for
why it is only important that a unit can be articulated is the same as
the reason that in doing an analysis about the concept of length, it
does not matter whether the basic unit is the meter or the foot.
Questions in, say physics, can be addressed with either system of
measurement. What matters is simply that there exists a system of
measurement that is coherent.
For the concept of happiness, the fact that a metric can be articulated means that there is a system of measurement that is coherent. In fact, the metric employing “a typical sip of juice” and “a typical steak dinner,” which I articulated above, would itself suffice as
a coherent metric. We need not develop any metric further than
this, because regardless of which metric we articulate, it will not affect any of our prescriptions, and this is for the same reasons as the
fact that the laws of physics work equally well regardless of whether
we use feet or meters as our basic unit of length.

45. I will address below, in Part V (in a discussion of the existence or non-existence of
“zero points” and what the implications of this question are for the plausibility of AU-type
and TU-type aggregation), why it is not quite the case that we can leave this question aside.
Despite that (fairly circumscribed) discussion, however, my conclusion here in Part III (that
different choices of metrics for quantifying happiness in a moment do not affect our prescriptions) does constitute my general conclusion on the topic.
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C. Summary
Despite the fact that we as a society do not have a commonly
used metric for quantifying the happiness of a moment of experience, it turns out that this does not pose a problem for private law
remedies and the goal of bringing a person back to “the happiness
level that he was at.” As I’ve shown, we can in fact articulate a metric to quantify happiness, and the way in which we could do so is
very similar to the way in which we articulate metrics for physical
properties such as length and mass.
Not only does the current lack of a metric not pose a problem
for private law remedies, but it turns out that we do not need to articulate any specific metric for quantifying the happiness of a moment. This is because, as with the case of length, it doesn’t matter
for the purpose of any prescriptions or assessments which metric
one adopts. The results will be the same regardless of which metric
we choose to employ.
For the foregoing reasons, I will now leave aside the question of
how to quantify the amount of happiness in a particular moment. I
will simply assume not only that we can articulate a metric for
quantifying happiness at a particular moment, but that we in fact
already have such a metric that is commonly used, and that we can
employ this metric to determine how much happiness exists at a
particular moment of a person’s conscious experience.
In Part V, I will briefly scale back this assumption and probe further some questions related to how we quantify happiness of a particular moment, but, leaving aside the purposes in that specific
Part, I will assume throughout the remainder of this Article that we
need not further probe or question how we can or do quantify the
happiness of a particular moment.
IV. WHY WE DO NEED TO BE MORE PRECISE IN ARTICULATING AN
AGGREGATION MECHANISM: I.E., WHY THE CHOICE OF AGGREGATION
MECHANISM CAN AFFECT THE LAW’S PRESCRIPTIONS
A. Introduction
Two of the three imprecisions of the phrase “the happiness level
that one is at” have now been addressed and resolved. I already determined 46 (preliminarily at least) that “the happiness level that

46.

See supra Part II.
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one is at” refers to the happiness level of one’s future (as opposed
to the happiness level at a single particular moment, for one’s
whole life, or for some other temporal (or non-temporal) group47
ing of moments in a person’s life). I have now also addressed the
question of articulating a metric for quantifying the happiness at a
particular moment, and I have argued that we can leave this question aside and proceed as though we not only can articulate such a
metric, but that we in fact already have such a metric that is commonly used.
I thus can now address the most important topic of this Article:
the question of what our aggregation mechanism should be—i.e.,
what function we should use to derive the happiness value of a portion of a person’s life, given (and taking as inputs) particular happiness values of each of the component moments in this time period.
In Part II, above, I argued that it seemed as though the law’s
failure to choose an aggregation mechanism for determining the
happiness level of a person’s future doesn’t affect or interfere with
the law’s ability to provide a person with a future of the level it
would have been if not for a harm incurred. It seemed as though
we could avoid determining what the happiness level of a person’s
future would have been if not for the harm and what the happiness
level of a person’s future would be after the harm if there were no
remedy. Similarly (and relatedly), it seemed that we could avoid
determining how much happiness the person lost as a result of the
harm.
It turns out, however, that it only seemed that we could avoid
answering the question of which aggregation mechanism to
choose. It turns out that there are situations where we will need to
answer this question. Although it seemed as though the choice of
aggregation mechanism would not affect our prescriptions in any
cases, it turns out that there are some cases where the choice of
aggregation mechanism will affect our prescriptions. Because of
this, we are unable to avoid answering the question of which aggregation mechanism is most plausible. This Part shows why this is
the case.
I begin by (re-)introducing “different-numbers problems,” and I
explain that it is these types of cases, if we in fact confront them in
the law, that would require us to choose which aggregation mechanism is most plausible. I then explain how private law remedies
could confront and in fact do confront different-numbers cases. As
I explain, the situations where private law remedies confront dif-

47.

See supra Part III.
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ferent-numbers cases are cases where a person incurs a harm that
results in the person’s life being shortened (and this shortening of
a person’s life could be brought about either by an immediate
death or by a death, which, though non-immediate, nevertheless
will result in a person’s life being shorter than it otherwise would
have been).
B. Types of Cases Where We Will Have to Probe Further: “DifferentNumbers Cases” (as Distinguished from “Same-Numbers Cases”)—and
Why They Are Tricky
1. “Different-Numbers Cases”
The types of situations that require us to choose which aggregation method to espouse are cases that I will call “different-numbers
cases,” and these are to be distinguished from what I will call
“same-numbers cases.” Both different-numbers cases and samenumbers cases have the following features. Both cases are cases
where we are comparing two (or more than two, but for simplicity’s sake, I’ll focus on two) possible states of affairs, both of which
contain a number of parts (or “components”), and in both of
which the goodness or value of each of the whole states of affairs is
a function of the goodness or value of each of the components that
exists in that state of affairs. These types of cases can arise in various contexts where the components are various different types of
things, but the two main types are (1) cases where a component is
a person’s life and where the whole is, say, a world, and (2) cases
where a component is a single conscious moment that a person
48
experiences and where the whole is, say, a person’s whole life.
Further, to keep things simple, I’ll focus in particular on the second of these two types of cases—cases where the components in
question are single conscious moments of a person. Thus, in the
cases that I’m considering, we’re comparing the goodness of two
states of affairs, and each state of affairs is made up of nothing oth-

48. Although these two examples involve a world (the whole) that is made up of people
(the components) and a person (the whole) that is made up of conscious moments (the
components), all sorts of other possible same-numbers and different-numbers cases exist.
For example, to name just a few other types of data that could give rise to different-numbers
and same-numbers cases: They could involve things such as wins and games played for a
sports team, or shots made and shots taken by a player in basketball, or numbers of pieces
one has in a game of checkers and whether the pieces are kings or not. In this Article, however, I will focus on cases where the whole is a person’s life (or a portion thereof), and
where the components are his moments of conscious experience.
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er than conscious moments experienced by a person. Further, the
goodness or value (here, happiness level) of a whole state of affairs
is a function of the goodness or value (here, happiness level) of its
components. The foregoing features are what same-numbers cases
and different-numbers cases have in common.
The way in which same-numbers cases and different-numbers
cases differ is (perhaps unsurprisingly in light of the names I’ve
given them) that in same-numbers cases, the numbers of components in the two states of affairs being compared are the same,
whereas in different-numbers cases, the numbers of components in
the two states of affairs being compared are different.
Taking as our two basic aggregation methods the two aggregation methods that I introduced in Part II, TU-type aggregation and
AU-type aggregation, we can now see that while same-numbers cases will not require us to choose between these two methods, the
different-numbers cases will require us to do so.
Let’s first consider a same-numbers case. Take, for example, a
case where a state of affairs, call it s1, is made up of a person
named Bill’s future. Suppose that s1 involves ten conscious moments. Each conscious moment is at a happiness level of seven.
Suppose that a different state of affairs, s2, is a different possible
future that might be in store for Bill. It also involves ten conscious
moments, but due to a harm that befell Bill, all of the conscious
moments in s2 are at a happiness level of five. In assessing the
happiness levels (or levels of goodness or value) of s1 and s2, and
in assessing whether s1 or s2 is the state of affairs with a higher
happiness level (or a higher level of goodness or value), we need
not choose between AU-type aggregation and TU-type aggregation.
According to both aggregation methods, the happiness level of s1
is higher than that of s2, and by the same ratio: According to AUtype aggregation, the happiness level of s1 is 7 and the happiness
level of s2 is 5, and according to TU-type aggregation, the happiness level of s1 is 70 and the happiness level of s2 is 50. Further, in
same-numbers cases, it will always be the case that AU-type aggregation and TU-type aggregation provide the same determination
of which state of affairs is better and provide the same ratio by
which this is the case. The reason for this is simple: the AU-type
aggregation value for a state of affairs is equal to the total number
of units divided by the number of components, and since the same
number of components exist in both states of affairs in a samenumbers case, the AU-type aggregation value for each state of af49. Or, more specifically, the two states of affairs are made up of nothing that’s relevant
for our inquiry other than conscious moments experienced by a person. I’m not denying that
other things exist in this state of affairs, such as trees, air, buildings, etc.

SPRING 2020]

Calculating Compensation

641

fairs will be arrived at by taking the TU-type aggregation sum in
each case and dividing it by the same number in each case. Thus, if
a TU-type happiness level number for s1 is higher than a TU-type
happiness level number for s2, and by a ratio of, say, seven to five,
dividing the TU-type happiness level numbers for s1 and s2 by the
50
same number preserves both the fact that the s1 number is bigger
than the s2 number, and the ratio by which this is so. In light of
this, in same-numbers cases, we need not make a choice between
espousing a TU-type aggregation mechanism or an AU-type aggregation mechanism.
In different-numbers cases, however, we generally do have to
choose between espousing TU-type aggregation and AU-type aggregation, and this is because the two aggregation methods do not
always provide the same assessments of states of affairs. Take, for
example, two possible futures for Bill. In s3, which is identical to s1
(above), Bill’s future includes ten conscious moments, each of
which is at a happiness level of seven. In s4, however, there are
fewer moments in Bill’s future, because Bill dies sooner. In s4,
however, Bill has a higher level of happiness in the moments that
he does have. In s4, there are only five conscious moments, but
each one is at a happiness level of ten. Given these two possible
states of affairs, which one has a higher happiness level (or, stated
slightly differently, which state of affairs has more happiness? Or,
stated in another way, which of these two states of affairs is better?)
One’s answer to this question will depend, crucially, on whether
one espouses TU-type aggregation or AU-type aggregation, because they will not say the same thing. According to TU-type aggregation, the happiness level of s3 is 70, and the happiness level
of s4 is 50. According to AU-type aggregation, however, the happiness level of s3 is 7, and the happiness level of s4 is 10. Thus, TUtype aggregation says that s3 has a higher happiness level than s4,
but AU-type aggregation says that s4 has a higher happiness level
than s3. While in this case TU-type aggregation and AU-type aggregation have differing assessments of which state of affairs has a
higher happiness level, this is not always the case. Even in many
cases where they do not have differing assessments of which state
of affairs has a higher happiness level, though, they still may provide different assessments, because even if both say that one state
of affairs is the better one, one of the mechanisms might say that
the happier state of affairs only has slightly more happiness,
50. This holds true because the number of components will always be a positive number. Also, though the following feature is not required for the statements in question to
hold true, it’s worth noting that the number of components will also always be a whole
number.
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whereas the other mechanism might say that the gap in happiness
level between the two states of affairs is huge.
These examples illustrate that different-numbers cases require
us to choose between TU-type aggregation and AU-type aggregation. It’s important to note, though, that these different numberscases need not be comparisons between states of affairs where the
components are conscious moments of a person’s life. Instead,
perhaps, the numbers in the examples above could be applied to
an example where the numbers represent years of life in one’s future (which, of course, could also be considered to be shorthand
for, say, one billion conscious moments). Further, leaving aside the
context where a state of affairs consists of one life, similar examples
can be provided where the state of affairs consists in the whole
population and where the components (of which there are different numbers in the two states of affairs) are the people alive in
each possible population. Similarly, in different-numbers cases in
these contexts, we need to choose between AU-type aggregation
and TU-aggregation.
2. Why “Different-Numbers Cases” Are Tricky
The choice about which aggregation mechanism to espouse is
not an easy one to make, and this is because all possible views are
seemingly afflicted by devastating counterintuitive implications. I
address the question of which aggregation mechanism to espouse
51
in much greater depth elsewhere, but I here provide a brief preview of some of the seemingly devastating counterintuitive implications that appear to render TU-type aggregation and AU-type aggregation implausible (despite their otherwise attractive features).
Consider the following points that show some of the main difficulties that afflict TU-type and AU-type aggregation. First, as to TUtype aggregation.
Despite the prima facie plausibility of TU-type aggregation, it
seems as though there are some considerations that cast doubt on

51. See Pressman, supra, note 9; see also Michael Pressman, A Defense of Average Utilitarianism, 27 UTILITAS 389 (2015); see generally Gustaf Arrhenius, An Impossibility Theorem in Population Axiology with Weak Ordering Assumptions, in PHILOSOPHICAL CRUMBS. ESSAYS DEDICATED
TO ANN-MARI HENSCHEN-DAHLQUIST ON THE OCCASION OF HER SEVENTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY 11
(Rysiek Sliwinski ed., 1999); GUSTAF ARRHENIUS, FUTURE GENERATIONS: A CHALLENGE FOR
MORAL THEORY (2011); Gustaf Arrhenius, The Impossibility of a Satisfactory Population Ethics, in
3 DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE APPROACHES TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1 (H. Colonius & E.
Dzhafarov eds., 2011); JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING LIVES (2004); Parfit, supra note 13; LARRY S.
TEMKIN, RETHINKING THE GOOD (2012); Thomas Hurka, Value and Population Size, 93 ETHICS
496 (1983); Jeff McMahan, Problems of Population Theory, 92 ETHICS 96 (1981).

SPRING 2020]

Calculating Compensation

643

the plausibility of TU-type aggregation. Consider the following two
(similar) thought experiments.
First, consider the “The Single-Life Repugnant Conclusion.” If
TU-type aggregation is the correct measure for assessing the goodness of a life, then the following is an implication of this view: for
any life of however many moments, each of fantastically high happiness level, there is a better possible life that exists that is composed only of moments (as long as there are enough of them) of a
positive value, where that value is so infinitesimally small that a
person is almost indifferent to being alive. At every moment, this
person would be just the slightest notch above the happiness level
at which one would prefer to not be alive. Nevertheless, TU-type
aggregation implies that this would will be better than the shorter
life wherein every moment is fantastically happy, because if there
are enough moments of the positive yet tiny value, they will outweigh the number of units of happiness in the shorter life, despite
all the moments in the shorter life being of a fantastically high
happiness level. This conclusion is thought to be repugnant,
though, and thus the fact that this is an implication of TU-type aggregation provides some reason to think that TU-type aggregation
52
cannot be correct. It elicits the intuitions that there is at least
some importance of and relevance of the happiness level that one
experiences at the different moments of one’s life and that everything does not boil down to the total number of units of happiness
experienced.
While this thought experiment was couched in fairly abstract
terms and also in terms of a person whose moments of experience
are at such a low level that they are just a notch above the level at
which the person would prefer not to be alive, I can offer an additional thought experiment that elicits the same intuitions, but
which is slightly more applied and which does not necessarily employ a person being quite so close to the level where he would prefer to not be alive. This thought experiment, Haydn and the Oyster, asks: would one prefer to have the life of the composer Haydn,
who lives a good life and dies at the age of 75, or would one prefer
53
to live a two-thousand-year life as an oyster? This thought experiment, like the Intra-life Repugnant Conclusion, is meant to elicit
the intuitions that TU-type aggregation cannot be correct, and that
there is at least some importance of and relevance of the happiness
level that one experiences at different moments of one’s life and

52.
53.

See TEMKIN, supra note 51, at 119.
This thought experiment originated with Roger Crisp. See ROGER CRISP, MILL ON
UTILITARIANISM (1997).
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that everything does not boil down to the total number of units of
happiness experienced.
Second, as to AU-type aggregation.
Despite there being reasons to support AU-type aggregation,
there are also reasons to find that AU-type aggregation is not plausible.
The main problem with AU-type aggregation is that, while it
seemingly gets the right answer in the case of the single-life repugnant conclusion and Haydn and the oyster, it is susceptible to a
similar argument that shows that the implications of espousing AUtype aggregation are quite unpalatable. According to AU-type aggregation, the goodness of a life is determined by the average happiness of the moments in the life, and it does not matter how long
or short a life is. This means that given, say, a life that is 80 years
long and where each moment is at level 8, each of the following
lives, which is made up of moments of happiness level 8.01, is a
better life than the one that is 80 years long: A life of level 8.01 that
lasts twenty-five years, a life of level 8.01 that lasts ten years, a life of
level 8.01 that lasts one year, a life of level 8.01 that lasts for one
day, a life of level 8.01 that lasts for one minute, or even a life of
level 8.01 that just consists of one single conscious moment. That
each of these lives would, according to AU-type aggregation, be
better than the one that is at a level of 8 and lasts for 80 years, will
for many people be highly unpalatable.
Further, another implication of AU-type aggregation is that, if
one’s future would be of the same happiness level as one’s average
level of happiness so far, the shortening of one’s life would not
harm a person at all. This is an implication that for many people
will be highly unpalatable, and, in fact, it was the intuition that a
person can be harmed by having his life shortened that gave rise to
our whole inquiry into AU-type aggregation and TU-type aggregation. This was because it seemed as though our intuitions were at
odds with the current policy of the courts—a policy which says that
when a person has his life shortened, this does not harm the person.
This is only the tip of the iceberg about the topic of which ag54
gregation mechanism is most plausible, but this should give the
reader a sense of the difficulties that one confronts in the attempt
to choose which aggregation mechanism is most plausible.

54.

See Pressman, supra note 9.

SPRING 2020]

Calculating Compensation

645

C. How Private Law Remedies Could Confront and
Do Confront Different-Numbers Cases
1. How Private Law Remedies Could
Confront Different-Numbers Cases
The question now becomes: Does the law (and private law remedies in particular) ever confront different-numbers cases? The answer is “yes.”
Of course, this whole domain of questions—of same-numbers
cases and different-numbers cases alike—only arises when we’re attempting to make a comparison between two possible states of affairs. Thus, the first task is to determine what the possible states of
affairs are that we’re comparing. In our context, the first state of
55
affairs is the person’s “expected” future in the state of affairs
where no harm is incurred. The second state of affairs is the person’s “expected” future in the state of affairs where a harm is incurred. Thus, in comparing these two possible states of affairs, we’ll
have a same-numbers case if the two possible futures are of the
same length, and we’ll have a different-numbers case if the two
possible futures are of different lengths.
Typical cases that the law confronts are same-numbers cases.
Typically, a harm that is incurred by a person (be it a financial
harm or otherwise) does not affect the length of one’s expected
future. Of course, every event in one’s life affects the trajectory of
one’s future and thus even the occurrence of the most seemingly
insignificant event can have enormous effects on what transpires in
one’s future. Further, these effects on one’s future often will affect
how long one lives (i.e., how long one’s future is). Despite this,
however, these effects are usually highly unpredictable and there’s
usually no way of predicting whether a particular event will lengthen one’s life, shorten one’s life, or have no effect at all on the
length of one’s life. In light of this, when a harm is incurred by a
person, the “expected” effect that this harm has on the length of
the person’s life is typically zero. Thus, the typical cases that private
law remedies confront are same-numbers cases.
Private law remedies will confront a different-numbers problem,
however, if the harm brings about a change to the expected length

55. The word “expected” can refer to an estimation or guess, but it also can refer to a
probabilistic expected value, i.e., an expectation in a more rigorously calculated sense. Although there is overlap between these two senses of the word “expected,” here and in the
rest of the Article I intend to refer to the second of these two senses of the word “expected”
(unless I indicate otherwise).
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of the person’s life. An event that is a harm could bring about either an increase or a decrease in the expected length of the person’s life. I’ll focus here on cases where the harm causes a decrease
in the expected length of life, but it’s important to note that there
could also be harms that could create a different-numbers problem
by increasing the length of a person’s expected life. These cases
where a harm causes an increase in length of life could either be
due to the fact that the person is suffering and the increase in life
length is something that is itself a harm for the person, or it could
be due to the increase in life length being a benefit, but one which
comes along with and which is outweighed by a harm. I will leave
these possibilities aside, however, and focus on cases where there is
a harm and where we get a different-numbers case because the
harm decreases the length of a person’s life.
There is another interesting distinction to note here: among
these cases where there is a harm and where the harm causes a decrease in the expected length of the person’s life, it seems that
there are at least three categories of cases: those in which the only
harm to the person is due to the loss in years of life (and in which
there is no harm due to effects on the years that are still lived),
those in which the only harm to the person is due to effects on the
years that are still lived (and in which there is no harm due to the
lost years), and those in which there is harm due to the lost years
and due to the effects on the years that are still lived.
Regardless of the various ways to categorize these types of cases,
the bottom line here is that private law remedies can indeed confront different-numbers cases. These are cases where a harm is incurred and where the harm that is incurred also affects the expected length of the person’s life. While this is in fact the bottom
line here, we will soon see that the distinction between the cases
above is important. I will continue to leave aside the cases where
the harm involves an increase in the person’s expected length of
life , but there will be important points made about the two types
of ways in which there could be harm in the cases where there is
harm and where the person’s expected length of life decreases—
(1) harm due to the loss in years of life, and (2) harm due to harm
experienced during the years that are still lived.
The foregoing has showed how private law remedies can confront different-numbers cases. To further explore not only how
they can do so, but also how they do so, I will now consider some
specific factual situations that private law remedies confronts that
involve different-numbers cases.
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2. How Private Law Remedies Do Confront Different-Numbers
Cases: The Situations in Which a Person Is Harmed by
Having His Life Shortened
Situations in which lives are shortened are numerous and occur
in various forms.
As stated earlier in this Article, 56 the legal system could confront
cases of plaintiffs seeking a remedy for the harm of lost life-years in
two contexts. First, a case might be brought after a victim has died.
In such a case, although a remedy for the lost life-years might be
warranted in order to bring about optimal incentives for future
tortfeasors, it could be argued that plaintiffs should not recover for
this harm because this harm was to the victim herself who no longer is alive therefore cannot be compensated. This Article, however,
primarily explores a second context in which plaintiffs might seek
a remedy for the harm of lost life-years: cases in which a victim has
her expected future shortened by a tort, but in which she has not
yet died. In a case of this type, the fact that the victim is still alive
makes it possible to compensate the victim herself directly for the
value of life-years. Thus, even if compensation for lost life-years is
not warranted in cases where the victim is dead, it might still be
warranted in cases where the victim is still alive. Thus, going forward, this Article focuses primarily on situations in the latter category—where the victim is still alive at the time of suit.
The following are some examples of situations that can result in
lives being shortened: (1) medical malpractice, (2) torts of exposure to dangerous substances, such as asbestos, smoking, or other
carcinogens, (3) torts of accidents, such as car accidents involving
reckless driving, or construction accidents, and also (4) intentional
torts, including but not limited to intentional killings. Of these various examples, all can shorten lives, and some of them can also involve variants where not only is a life shortened but it is brought to
an immediate end. The foregoing are some of the main examples
of situations in which lives can be shortened, but other examples
exist as well.
To elaborate on one of these categories of cases, and to see how
it might be an example of a harm that shortens a person’s life,
consider medical malpractice. An example of a typical fact pattern
might be the following: A doctor negligently fails to correctly diagnose a disease or negligently fails to call for a procedure that would
show the existence of a disease. The patient then discovers the disease a year later, at which point the disease is at such an advanced

56.

See Introduction, supra.
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stage that nothing can be done to cure the disease, and it is estimated that the patient has one year left to live. If, however, the patient had become aware of the disease a year earlier, it could have
been easily treated and cured and the patient, based on his age,
would have an expected remaining life length of thirty years. Thus,
as a result of the doctor’s negligence, the patient’s expected length
of remaining life at the time of the negligence was shortened from
thirty-one years to two years.
Additionally, as stated above, all four of the categories mentioned in the non-exhaustive list could result in a shortening of life
that is brought about by an immediate death or by a death that is
not immediate. The example of medical malpractice happened to
involve a non-immediate death, but a variant of that case could involve immediate death. To further illustrate a possible case where
the shortening of life is brought about by an immediate death,
though, I offer additional examples from the third and fourth category above. On the one hand, in the context of negligence, there
are situations in which a person is killed immediately by another
person’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle. On the other
hand, in the context of an intentional tort, there are situations in
which a person murders another person and where the murderer
is the defendant in a civil case arising out of the murder. In both of
these types of cases, as with the original example of medical malpractice, a person’s life has been shortened. In these two latter cases, however, a person is not left with any remaining life at all.
Thus, there are various categories of cases in which a person can
have his life shortened. Further, for all of these categories, the
death that brings about the shortening of the person’s life can be
an immediate one or a non-immediate one, and if it’s a nonimmediate one, the death can happen at any possible point in time
in a person’s future—be it in the near future or be it in the distant
future.
Before continuing, it’s important to be clear about how prevalent these cases of a person having his life shortened are. These
types of cases where a person’s life is shortened certainly do not
constitute the majority of cases where a person is harmed. Much to
the contrary, they constitute the vast minority of cases in which a
person is harmed. Notwithstanding this, these cases are not to be
ignored. They are still numerous and important. Further, although
the following point is not one that is necessary for justifying the focus on these types of cases (cases where a harm shortens a person’s
life), I will explain in Part VI of this Article that there is reason to
believe that the prevalence of these cases is likely to grow significantly in the future as various technologies develop. Even leaving
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aside this conjecture, the prevalence of these cases today is still
substantial enough to deserve our close attention, focus, and analysis.
D. Summary
In sum, although in most cases we could do fine without articulating which mechanism we espouse for aggregating happiness,
there are cases in which we must be more precise and we must articulate which aggregation mechanism we espouse. These cases
that require us to be more precise are what I call “differentnumbers cases.” In the context of private law remedies, we could
encounter different-numbers cases if we have a tort that harms a
person by shortening his life. Not only can private law remedies
theoretically encounter different-numbers problems, but private
law remedies in fact does confront different-numbers problems
and I have described some examples of the fact patterns in which it
does so. Thus, it turns out that we do indeed need to be more precise; we need to be able to articulate a plausible account of which
aggregation mechanism we should espouse for aggregating happiness.
V. THE LAW’S POSITION ON SHORTENING-OF-LIFE ISSUES AND
HOW TO ASSESS WHETHER IT IS A GOOD POSITION
This leaves a number of important questions about shorteningof-life cases unanswered. First, can plaintiffs currently recover for
having their lives shortened? What is the current state of the law
with respect to such cases? Second, why might the law be the way it
is? Third, is the current state of the law satisfactory? I explore these
various topics in depth elsewhere. 57 I do, however, provide a brief
summary of these topics here.
A. The Law Regarding Situations in Which a Person Is Harmed by
Having His Life Shortened: Whether Recovery Is Allowed
Although there are various claims that can arise out of a tortious
shortening of a life, these claims typically cannot be brought until
the harmed individual has died. Further, the vast majority of these
claims are for the harms to the family of the decedent (both for
57.

See Pressman, supra note 9.
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economic and non-economic harms). There also can be recovery
for the decedent’s economic and non-economic losses incurred
before his death. There is a huge omission in the claims that can
be brought, however: what in many cases is quite possibly the worst
of all the harms incurred by the person is something that a legal
claim typically cannot be brought for (both, by him, while he is
alive and aware of the fact that his life has been shortened, and, by
his family, after his death): the harm to the decedent of the lost
years of life themselves.
There are, however, a few examples of cases where courts have
allowed recovery for a claim for the harm specifically of having
one’s life shortened. This, however, is extremely rare, and two of
58
the very few examples are Alexander v. Scheid, an Indiana Supreme
59
Court case, and Downie v. United States Lines Co., a Third Circuit
60
case. As for how these few courts calculated the amount of compensation for having one’s life shortened, seemingly very little
analysis went into the decision of how much compensation to provide. The courts simply assumed that the amount of compensation
should be calculated by employing something functionally equivalent to (what I call) TU-type aggregation, and they provided a certain amount of compensation for each year by which the person’s
61
life was shortened.
Thus, in sum, although the general rule is that courts do not allow a person to recover compensation for having his life shortened, there are a (very) few courts that have provided compensation to a person for having his life shortened. Even these courts
that have provided compensation to a person for having his life
shortened, however, provided very little insight into both (1) why a
party should be compensated for having his life shortened, and (2)
given that a party should be compensated for having his life shortened, how to quantify the value of this harm, and how to deter-

58. Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272 (Ind. 2000).
59. Downie v. United States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1966).
60. As for the state of the law regarding recovery for lost life-years in cases where the
victim has already died, almost no states permit recovery for such losses. A small minority of
“hedonic-loss states” (Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Hampshire, and New Mexico) do
allow compensation for “hedonic loss” incurred by the decedent as a result of his lost years
of life. See Durham v. Marberry, 156 S.W.3d 242 (Ark. 2004); Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172
(Conn. 1976); Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 364 (Haw. 1994); Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead School District, 733 A.2d 394 (N.H. 1999); New Mexico St. § 41-2-1; Smith
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1245 (N.M. 2000). But, even in these states, courts do
not always provide recovery for the hedonic loss caused by the lost years, and, where they do,
there is no clear system for calculating these damages, and the courts’ opinions are rife with
confusion.
61. As I will discuss in Part V, below, a measure of compensation of this sort could very
well turn out to be a plausible (or correct, or good) measure of compensation, but this is far
from obviously the case.
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mine how much financial compensation is the appropriate amount
to compensate for having one’s life shortened.
B. Making Sense of the Law’s Treatment of
(i.e., Identifying Its Position on)
These Shortening-of-Life Issues
The law generally does not allow recovery for a claim for the
harm to the person whose life is shortened for the lost years of life. As
for how to make sense of the law’s treatment of these cases and
identify its position on why no recovery is permitted, the inferences
we can make in the context of cases of immediate death are different from those that we can make in the context of cases of nonimmediate death.
In the context of immediate death, it is unclear whether the
failure to allow recovery for the lost years is due to practicalities of
the situation or a theoretical position; after all, the person is dead,
so he cannot be compensated even if we think he deserves compensation. In the context of non-immediate death, however, where
the practicalities of the situation do not prevent a person from suing and recovering, it becomes clear that the inability of a person
to recover is due to a theoretical position of the courts that a person should not be able to be compensated for having his life shortened. Further, given that private law remedies seek to compensate
a person for the harm he has incurred, the law seems to be telling
us that a person is not harmed by having his life shortened (i.e., by
losing years of life).
Various objections, rooted in practical considerations, could be
made to this inference, however.
For instance, one might argue that the reason courts do not allow a person to get compensated for having his life shortened is
not that the person is not harmed by this, but rather, that we just
aren’t equipped to make life expectancy estimates with any confidence when a person’s life expectancy might be affected by an
62
event but the death is not immediate. While this explanation
62. Another point that is related to this is that perhaps we do not think we are
equipped to make estimates with any confidence about a person’s future happiness levels.
This topic will be further discussed in Part VI. This on its own, however, does not provide a
plausible explanation for why we might not allow a person to be compensated for having his
life shortened. As long as we think that a person would be happy enough that he would be
benefited by additional years of life, then an inability to accurately estimate exactly how
happy the person would be doesn’t seem to be a reason to withhold compensation to a person. Difficulty in articulating future happiness levels would more appropriately come into
play in determining how much compensation a person should receive for having his life
shortened, not the prior question of whether he should be compensated at all.
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might have some prima facie plausibility, it fails for two reasons.
First, we do make life expectancy estimates all the time. These estimates are made both (a) in society in general, and also (b) specif63
ically by the courts, albeit in other contexts. Second, even if it
weren’t for the fact that we do make estimates in various type of
cases, there are some cases that are so clear cut in terms of it being
obvious that a person has had his life shortened, that even if we
usually do not have confidence in our estimates about life expectancy, these cases would and should constitute exceptions.
A second possible explanation for why courts might not allow
recovery for the harm of having one’s life shortened is the following: in order for a person to be able to bring a claim for having his
life shortened, he will have to be alive (i.e., the harm will have to
be due to a non-immediate death), but in the cases in which a person is still alive, not only is the life expectancy estimate often difficult to make, but it also will often be difficult to know whether the
event in question will in fact lead to future death at all. Accordingly, there is a concern about pre-emptive suing and whether a claim
would be ripe.
Thus, the problem for some of these shortened-life claims seems
to be that on the one hand, they’re only certain when the death
occurs, but, on the other hand, the person can only be compensated while he is still alive. Thus, it seems that a person should at
least potentially be able to be compensated earlier on in life even if
the death is not certain, but, on the other hand, we typically do not
award compensation for claims that are conjectural, probabilistic,
and not yet ripe.
This type of conundrum, it seems, might be a practical reason
that courts have typically not allowed compensation for a person
64
whose life has been shortened. Even this, however, could only be
a partial explanation of the current law, because there are various
cases that avoid these concerns by having a future death that for
one reason or other is particularly certain, despite its being in the
future.
Thus, it seems that to the extent that a person should be compensated for a shortened life, these concerns about preemptive-

63. Life expectancy estimates are made, even in the context of wrongful death cases,
for the purpose of determining the financial support that a spouse would have received
from the decedent. See, e.g., In re Delmoro, 2015 NY Slip Op. 25146 [48 Misc.3d 628, 631]
(2015).
64. I think that this might very well play at least some role in explaining the inability to
recover for having one’s life shortened. Further, to the extent that a conclusion of this Article is that there should be compensation for a person whose life is shortened, the consideration here will be a potential obstacle, and a topic that will be relevant to consider when we
determine the details of how to compensate a person for his having his life shortened.
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ness, speculativeness, ripeness and lack of certainty should not
stand as a bar that prevents a person from recovering compensation for having his life shortened. Notwithstanding this, these concerns are important, and I will return to discuss them in Part VI.
In sum, it seems that there are some important possible practical
explanations for why it might be that we do not allow recovery of
compensation for a person who has his life shortened. To the extent that one or more of these explanations (or perhaps multiple
explanations jointly) were to explain our disallowance of recovery
for these claims, it then would not necessarily be the case that the
law is stating that a person is not harmed by having his life shortened. As I have argued above, though, it seems as though the practical explanations do not cover all cases, and thus it seems that
even if these practical considerations are important and relevant,
they do not fully explain our disallowance of recovery for having
one’s life shortened. Thus, it does seem that the law likely in at
least some cases is saying that a person is not harmed by having his
life shortened. For this reason alone, it will be crucial to explore
the question of whether the law is right about this: is it the case
that a person in fact is not harmed by having his life shortened?
The various foregoing points justify my inquiry (in Part V) into
whether a person is harmed by having his life shortened. However,
in light of the fact that I’ve stated that the practical considerations
do not fully cover all cases and thus do not fully explain our disallowance of recovery, I will assume throughout the rest of this Article that the law currently is stating that a person is not harmed by
65
having his life shortened.
C. Next Steps: How to Assess Whether the Law’s Position on
Shortening-of-Life Issues Is a Good One
The question now is what we should make of the fact that the
law says that a person is not harmed by having his life shortened.
Prima facie, it seems that this is a mistake. After all, most people
would view the shortening of one’s life—be it via an immediate
death or by a death that is further into the future—to be among
the most severe harms that one could possibly incur.

65. It may or may not be the case that the law is stating this, but (1) given the considerations that I have discussed, see discussion here in Part V.B, it is not an unreasonable assumption, and (2) not much hangs on the assumption. Not much hangs on the assumption
because even if it is not true, the inquiries in this Article will be just as important as if the
assumption were correct.
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Thus, the next step is to turn to the question of whether a person is harmed by having his life shortened, and, if so, how much of
a harm this is. The answers to these questions will be a function of
which aggregation mechanism we espouse, which in turn will be a
function of which aggregation mechanism is the most plausible.
Although providing an answer to these questions is a timeconsuming and arduous task that is beyond the scope of this Arti66
cle, this Section sketches out how I address this task elsewhere.
Here, I consider briefly (1) which aggregation mechanism is the
most plausible, and (2) how we can convert our answers to the
happiness questions into a measure of compensation for the aggrieved person.
1. Determining Which Aggregation Mechanism Is the
Most Plausible
We can determine whether a person is harmed by having his life
shortened by choosing which aggregation mechanism we think is
most plausible for determining the value of a temporal portion of a
person’s life. The choice of aggregation mechanism enables us to
do this, because it enables us to aggregate and quantify the happiness that the life would have contained if not for it having been
shortened, and also to aggregate and quantify the happiness that
the life will contain given that the event that caused the shortening
did in fact occur. Even though these determinations are mere estimates (because we cannot predict the future), the aggregation
mechanism provides the function to go from the values of the parts
to the value of the whole (a temporal period of a life or a sub-part
thereof). Armed with a metric for quantifying the value of the person’s life in both possible states of affairs (the one in which the
harm is incurred and the one in which no harm is incurred), we
can then quantify how much happiness a person lost as a result of
his having his life shortened.
Depending on one’s aggregation mechanism of choice, it might
be the case that having one’s life shortened cannot be a harm, or
that it can be. Further, if one’s aggregation mechanism gives one
the result that a person can (in general) be harmed by having his
life shortened, applying the aggregation mechanism to the facts of
a particular case would enable us to make an estimate about
whether there in fact was a harm to the person in the particular
case due to his having his life shortened. Further, if there was a

66.

See generally Pressman, supra note 9.
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harm to the person, applying the aggregation mechanism to the
facts of the case would also enable one to determine how much the
person was harmed (in terms of happiness) by having his life
shortened.
Thus, our determination of the aggregation mechanism will tell
us whether—and, if so, how much (in terms of happiness)—a person is harmed by having his life shortened.
Our, question, then, will be whether we should espouse TU-type
aggregation, AU-type aggregation (and if so, which sub-version of
AU-type aggregation, because it turns out that, based on one’s
choice of the relevant temporal “reference class,” AU-type aggregation can take a number of different forms), or some hybrid alternative aggregation type (or, further, some other type of aggrega67
tion mechanism altogether).
As I have argued elsewhere, it turns out that unless we espouse
what I will call the “lost years” temporal sub-version of AU-type aggregation, we will think that a person can be harmed by having his
life shortened. Thus, unless one espouses the lost years version of
AU-type aggregation, one will think that there can be cases where
there should be compensation for a person for his having his life
shortened. This is an important finding, especially in light of the
fact that the status quo of the law is that courts almost as a rule do
68
not compensate people for having their lives shortened. Unless
we espouse a particular theory (namely AU, and the version of AU
that compares the lost years themselves), the status quo must
change. We should compensate people for having their lives shortened.
As we see, the first step in exploring what the law should do
about cases involving the shortening-of-life issues is to determine
which aggregation mechanism to espouse. The second step is to
determine how much happiness this aggregation mechanism says
that a person lost. I have now touched on these steps. The third
step, which I carry out elsewhere but touch on briefly below, is
then to determine how much money will bring about a happiness
transfer that will return to a person the amount of happiness that
he lost.

67. The very few courts that have allowed recovery have used TU-type aggregation but
have not grounded that application in any analysis. See supra, note 58, 59 and accompanying
text.
68. See Pressman, supra note 9.
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2. Converting the Answer to the Happiness Questions into a
Measure of Compensation for the Aggrieved Person
While espousing the version of AU that compares the lost years
themselves would prescribe that there be no remedy for having
one’s life shortened, the various other theories of happiness do not
yield obvious prescriptions in terms of what the appropriate remedy should be for a person whose life is shortened. Further inquiry
and analysis are required to convert the assessments (be they absolute or relative) of these other theories into remedy quantities to
award to the person whose life was shortened.
Thus, carrying out this further inquiry and analysis is the next
step: That is, the inquiry is into how to translate the information
regarding (a) the facts in terms of happiness of a particular case,
combined with the information about (b) the choice of aggregation mechanism and the choice of a temporal reference class (leaving aside the lost years version of AU, for which we already know
the answer to the inquiry), into (c) a determination of what remedy (i.e., how much compensation) we should give to the person
whose life has been shortened to bring them back to the level that
69
they would have been at if not for the harm that they incurred.
*

*

* *

In sum, the foregoing sketches the analysis required to be carried out in order to answer the questions of (1) whether a person
is harmed by having his life shortened, (2) if the person is harmed
by having his life shortened, how much a person is harmed by having his life shortened (in terms of happiness), and (3) if the person is harmed by having his life shortened, how much he should
be compensated in tort to bring him back to the level that he was
at. The three steps to carry out in order to answer these questions
involve (1) determining which aggregation mechanism is most
plausible, (2) determining how much happiness, according to the
aggregation mechanism of choice, has been lost by the person as a
result of the lost years, and (3) determining how much of a money
transfer to the plaintiff would bring the plaintiff’s to the level of
happiness that it would have been at (according to the aggregation
mechanism of choice) had the plaintiff not incurred the harm that
he incurred.

69.

Id.
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VI. EXTENSIONS
As we have seen, the conclusions of this Article carry both theoretical significance and matter concretely for a significant number
of cases, including all those where remedy is sought for the shortening of a life. That set of cases is already substantial, since it includes, among others, cases of (1) malpractice, (2) torts of exposure to dangerous substances, (3) torts involving accidents, and (4)
intentional torts.
In this Part, I raise and address three important sets of extensions to this Article’s conclusions. First, I show that technological
advances are likely to expand significantly the set of cases where
courts must confront shortening-of-life cases. Second, I show that
courts must confront different-numbers problems (and thus
choose an appropriate aggregation mechanism) even in some cases where no shortening of life is involved. Third, I show that different-numbers problems in the population-wide context are already
confronted by the law and by society in a wide range of areas—
even if not by courts—and it is crucial to articulate a solution to
different-numbers problems in this context as well. All three expansions will show that the problems addressed in this Article extend farther and wider than has been apparent so far.
A. Various Ways in Which the Development of Technology Is Likely to
Increase the Prevalence of Situations that Confront the Topics of
This Article (Regarding Different-Numbers Problems and the
Shortening of a Person’s Life)
For various reasons, it seems as though the prevalence of cases
of shortening of life (i.e., different-numbers problems) in the law
is likely to be much greater in the future than it is now. This is
primarily due to various ways in which technology might affect
things. In particular, it seems that technology will provide us with
greater and greater ability to be accurate and precise in our estimates of how long a particular person will live.
1. Technology Is Likely to Bring About More Knowledge About
Life Expectancies, and thus There Will Be More Cases Where One
Can Know that One’s Life Has Been Shortened
With the current state of our technology, it is often very difficult
to make good estimates of how long a person will live—be it either
absent a life-shortening harm having been incurred or be it after
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the occurrence of, and taking into account the existence of, a lifeshortening event. As I discussed in Part IV.D.2, this inability of ours
to make good estimates of how long a person will live is, I think,
perhaps one of the main reasons that the law has been able to
avoid seriously considering the questions about remedies for
shortened life that have been the subject of this Article. In most
situations it seems all but impossible to make an estimate with any
confidence about how long a person will live or about how a particular event in a person’s life will affect the length of his life. (Of
course, as I’ve argued, while this may have contributed to the law’s
failure to consider these questions, the failure to consider these
questions has still been a glaring omission, because even with our
current technology there are cases where we are able to make estimates, and in many of these cases we are able to make estimates
with high confidence about the number of years a life has been
shortened by, because the facts are clear and stark.)
The various situations discussed in this Article have been cases
where it seems that we are able, with greater confidence, to make
estimates about how much an event shortens a person’s life: These
estimates we have considered have generally been a result of the
clear and stark contrast between (1) the general remaining life expectancy of a person given his current age and what the life expectancy is of human beings, and (2) the drastically shorter remaining
life expectancy that we have high confidence in our estimate of, be
it due to an immediate death or due to confident assessment that a
person will only have six months or a year to live as a result of having a cancer that is advanced and the effects on life expectancy of
which are well known.
If, however, our estimates were able to get more precise and accurate, due to developments of technology, then it seems that the
number of cases where we can know with confidence that an event
causes an increase or decrease in life expectancy will grow, and
along with this increase there will be an increase in the number of
people seeking to be compensated for decreases in the length of
their lives.
Further, there does seem to be reason to think that technology
will enable us to have better and better estimates regarding how
long a particular person will live. Our scientific and technological
capacities grow every year and there is no reason to think that
these developments will not yield a more exact science regarding
life expectancy. Further, it might not only be that we will become
better able to predict the effects on life expectancy of serious
events such as traumatic injuries and failures to correctly diagnose
diseases at an early stage, but we might even become able to pre-
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dict with accuracy and precision the effects on life expectancy of
more and more seemingly trivial events (such as catching a cold or
undergoing a stressful week at work) as our science and technology
advances even further.
Additionally, not only might our scientific and technological developments enable us to make better estimates about life expectancy, but so too might these developments enable us to better
predict the levels of happiness that a person will experience in his
future. While information about future happiness will not directly
lead to more cases of different-numbers problems that the law will
confront, it might do so indirectly. This is because, while perhaps
with our current state of knowledge it might seem as though huge
uncertainty and variance in our prediction of the future happiness
level of a person might overwhelm and obscure any information we
might have about a small difference in the expected length of
one’s future, if we have more accurate and precise estimates of
happiness levels in the future, this might change things. If we have
more accurate and precise estimates of happiness levels in the future, this might make it the case that a loss of a small amount of
one’s length of life would still be clear enough in terms of how
much of a happiness loss one would incur during the lost period of
life that one might then be able to bring a suit that one otherwise
would not if there were less information about one’s future happiness levels. (If the disparity between the two states of affairs in
terms of length of life lost were large, however, it seems that even
imprecise estimates of future happiness levels would not prevent
there from being fairly clear cases of losses to one’s expected future happiness.)
In sum, it seems that developments in science in technology are
likely to lead to much better estimates of how long a person will
live, and this will likely make it the case that, in the future, more
people will have claims about specific losses to their life expectancy. In light of this, the questions raised in this Article will grow in
importance going forward, and they will be brought to the forefront of both theoretical and practical legal discussions and debates.
2. Inventions that Give Rise to the Need for
Policy Decisions that Confront the Topics of this Article
There is an additional way in which technology might bring
questions associated with different-numbers problems and the
shortening of a person’s life to the forefront. Developments in science and technology might give rise to inventions that force us to
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make policy decisions reflecting a decision about which aggregation mechanism is most plausible.
Consider, for example self-driving cars. In deciding how to program the cars to handle certain types of situations (such as an impending accident that could be avoided but only by causing a different type of accident), decisions must be made about how we
value quantity and quality of life. This type of weighing in these
cases can be about weighing quantities of lives versus quality of lives
(in cases where different numbers of people could be killed or injured by different actions taken by the self-driving car), but this
type of weighing in these cases can also be about weighing quantity
of moments in a single life versus the quality of moments in a single life (if, say, weighing two different types of injuries to the same
70
person). These latter cases of intrapersonal weighings are the
types of different-numbers problems I have been addressing in this
Article.
To the extent that developments in science and technology lead
to the need for decisions of this sort, this is another way in which
developments in science and technology can lead to the increased
prevalence and importance of the questions at issue in this Article
about which aggregation mechanism is the most plausible.
3. The Advent of Technology Increasing Lifespans Will
Increase the Prevalence of Situations that Confront the
Topics of this Article
There are also other examples of ways in which developments in
science and technology might give rise to increased prevalence of
the questions regarding different-numbers problems associated
with different lengths of a person’s life that I discuss in this Article.
One other such example is that there are starting to be discoveries
about drugs that might increase people’s life span, and there is
reason to think that these technologies will develop and that we
might have the ability to greatly increase a person’s lifespan by having them undergo a particular treatment.
If it does turn out that we will start to be able to greatly increase
people’s life spans, there are various ways in which this might increase the prevalence and importance of the questions regarding
70. The European Union is establishing several fora for the research of just such questions. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions: On the Road to Automated
Mobility: An EU Strategy for Mobility of the Future, at 17, COM (2018) 283 final (May 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/3rd-mobilitypack/com20180283_en.pdf.
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different-numbers problems associated with different lengths of a
person’s life. The following are among them.
(1) This technology would introduce an additional way in which
a person’s life expectancy can be varied, thus introducing ways in
which a person can be harmed by having his life expectancy shortened, (2) there would be greater possible amounts of life that
could be lost, and thus people might pay more attention to the
need for compensation for a person who has his life shortened, (3)
different people might not have equal access to these treatments,
and thus different lives might be of very different lengths, thus
making it harder (i.e., a more flagrant mistake), for the purposes
of private law remedies, to just treat all lives as being of the same
length and to thus ignore length of life altogether (as we currently
71
do). Lastly, perhaps more broadly and more generally, but also
most importantly, (4) as we start to have more options for different
lengths of lives, we will more frequently and in various ways and
various contexts confront questions about how to value chunks of
life for a person and how to trade off quantity of life versus quality
of life for a person.
4. Summary
For the various reasons provided in this Section, there are strong
reasons to think that developments in science and technology are
likely to lead to growing importance, going forward, of the questions discussed in this Article regarding different-numbers problems and the shortening of a person’s life. As we move forward, it
seems likely that these questions will become more and more prevalent in life, the legal system (including private law remedies), and
in and for policy in general. In light of this, although it is already
of great importance to address these difficult questions now—even
leaving aside my discussion of the future—my hypotheses about
how science and technology in the future will increase the prevalence and importance of these topics make it even more important
that we address these questions head-on now. If we do so, we will
then be armed with greater clarity on these issues for when their
prevalence becomes even greater and more pervasive in the future.

71. Of course, as discussed in this Article, not only do we currently ignore lengths of
lives and treat all lives as being of the same length, but, as a general rule, we also do not
compensate people for having their lives shortened. The two topics mentioned here are issues that are related but distinct.
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B. Situations Confronting the Choice Between Aggregation Mechanism
that Do Not Fall into the Same Category as Those Addressed
Throughout This Article (i.e., Situations that Do Not Involve the
Shortening of a Person’s Life)
Recall that the point throughout this Article has been that it is
cases of different-numbers problems—and not cases of samenumbers problems—that give rise to the need to decide which aggregation mechanism we find most plausible. In same-numbers
problems, we don’t seem to have to choose which aggregation
mechanism to employ, because all aggregation mechanisms have
the same prescriptions. While these points are true, I think that
there are some situations in which same-numbers cases might behave like different-numbers cases, and in these situations, it seems
that we will have to choose which aggregation mechanism to employ. This might occur in a few types of situations, one of which is
the following.
Suppose that there are two plaintiffs who are harmed by a defendant, and that the harm incurred does not affect the life expectancy of either plaintiff. Because life expectancies are not affected,
we would seemingly have a same-numbers problem. Suppose, however, that the defendant does not have enough money to fully
72
compensate both plaintiffs. Suppose further that in a case of this
sort, where we cannot bring both plaintiffs one hundred-percent of
the way back to the level that they were at, that what we want to do
is to treat both plaintiffs equally. Treating the plaintiffs equally in a
case like this, however, could be defined in different ways.
One way in which one might define bringing about equal treatment in a case like this would be to use the available funds of the
defendant to move the two plaintiffs an equal number of units of
happiness in the direction of the level that they were at. If this were
the principle that we employed, we would be forced to address the
question of which aggregation mechanism is most plausible. For
the purposes of the following, in order to focus in on the question
I’m addressing, I will make the simplifying assumption that the
plaintiffs have the same conversion rate between money and happiness.
On the one hand, if we espoused TU, then we would provide the
amounts of money to both plaintiffs that we think would provide
them with the same number of sum-aggregative units of happiness

72. And perhaps the defendant also does not even have enough money to compensate
either one of the plaintiffs fully. Regardless of whether this is the case, though, what’s relevant here is that the defendant does not have enough to compensate both of the plaintiffs
fully.
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to add to the amount of happiness units that they will experience
going forward. Because I’m assuming that the two plaintiffs have
the same conversion rates between utility and money, they would
then receive the same sums of money.
If, on the other hand, we espoused AU, the analysis about how
much money to give to the two plaintiffs might be different than it
was with TU. With AU, we would provide the amounts of money to
the plaintiffs that we think would bring about an increase in the
same number of units of happiness, as quantified by AU—i.e., an
increase in the average happiness for the person over the relevant
period of time. Of course, what the relevant period of time is
would be a function of which version of AU one espouses, and the
relevant period might be one’s whole life, or one’s future. Regardless of which version of AU one espouses, more information regarding that chunk of time (for both plaintiffs) would be relevant
for the determination of how to divide the defendant’s funds to
bring about an equal gain in units of average happiness to the two
plaintiffs. Again, we are assuming that the conversion rate of happiness to money is the same for both plaintiffs, and, in light of this,
we will not need to know what the happiness level (or financial
wealth) is for the plaintiffs during the respective chunks of time
(be it their futures or their whole lives). Their happiness level will
not come into play. What will be relevant to know, however, is how
long this chunk of time is for the two plaintiffs respectively. This is
because if we are to bring about an increase in average happiness
for a chunk of time for two people, and person one’s chunk of
time is twice as long as person two’s chunk of time, it will take twice
as many sum-aggregative units of happiness added to person one’s
chunk of time to increase his chunk of time by a certain number of
units of average happiness as it would to increase person two’s
chunk of time by the same number of units of average happiness.
In light of this, for cases of the sort that I am considering, if we
are trying to treat two plaintiffs equally by bringing them the same
amount of an increase in happiness, we will confront the question
of which aggregation mechanism is most plausible, and this is because different aggregation mechanisms will yield different prescriptions about how to divide the defendant’s money. TU would
suggest splitting it equally and ignoring information about lengths
of any lives or the lengths of any parts of any lives, whereas a
“whole-life” version of AU would determine how to divide the
money based on what the expected life length will be of the two
plaintiffs, whereas a “future” version of AU would determine how
to divide the money based on what the expected length of the two
plaintiffs’ futures will be. Thus, in the scenarios I’m considering,
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and on the definition of “treating the plaintiffs equally” that I’ve
been considering, we would be forced to determine which aggregation mechanism we think is most plausible.
Now let’s consider another possible definition of “bringing
about equal treatment” for the two plaintiffs—i.e., a definition
other than providing them with equal amounts of happiness (however that phrase, in turn, gets defined). Another way in which one
might think that we bring about equal treatment in the cases we
are addressing would be to bring both plaintiffs an equal percentage
of the way back to the level that they were at, given the constraints
of how much money the defendant has. While this type of a situation could arise in the context of a tort suit, this method of providing the same percentage of a plaintiff’s loss to the various plaintiffs
(a loss which in some cases could be quantified financially, but
which here we are quantifying in terms of loss to a plaintiff’s happiness level) is akin to the way matters are handled in other areas
of the law, including, among others, in bankruptcy. In bankruptcy,
there are often different creditors that have a claim of the same
priority to the debtor’s assets, and when this is the case, the available funds are distributed among the creditors so that they each receive the same percentage of the money they are owed by the
debtor. Since these creditors are of the same priority level, we
strive to bring each of them back the same percent of the way to
the level that they were at before the debtor’s defaulted on the
73
loans and filed for bankruptcy.
If this were the way we defined treating the plaintiffs equally, we
would not need to address the aggregation mechanism question.
This is because the prescriptions for how to divide the defendant’s
money between the two plaintiffs would be the same regardless of
74
which aggregation mechanism we thought was most plausible. On
TU, both plaintiffs suffer a certain amount of a loss in sumaggregative units of happiness (be it directly through a tort that is a
non-economic harm, or be indirectly through a tort that is an economic harm), and then they will be returned (via a monetary sum)
an equal percent of the loss in sum-aggregative units of happiness.
On AU, even though the loss in AU is calculated in part by looking
at how long the relevant chunk of time is for the person (be it his
whole lifetime or his future), it is also a function of how many sumaggregative units of happiness we think that the person, as a result
of the harm, has lost for that time chunk. Thus, regardless of which
73. See generally, David A. Skeel, Jr., The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 699, 700 (2018).
74. Recall again that I’m assuming that both plaintiffs have the same conversion rate
between money and happiness.
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time period we say is relevant and regardless of how long these respective time periods are for the two people, the loss in AU units
for both people will be proportional to the loss of sum-aggregative
happiness units that they incur for that time period. Thus, the way
to return the two plaintiffs an equal proportion of their losses in
happiness according to either version of the AU theory will, just as
with TU, require a return of a number of sum-aggregative happiness units to one plaintiff that is the same percentage of his total
loss of sum-aggregative happiness units as is the other plaintiff’s
percentage recovery of his total loss of sum-aggregative happiness
units.
Hence, if we are employing an “equal percentage of loss” recovery theory of equal treatment of the plaintiffs, we need not address
the happiness aggregation mechanism question, because the prescriptions of all the different aggregation mechanisms come out as
being the same.
In sum, if one adopts the theory of equal treatment of plaintiffs
that involves giving each plaintiff the same amount of happiness
back, then, in the scenarios I’m considering, we will confront the
question of which aggregation mechanism is most plausible. If,
however, we instead adopt the “equal percentage of loss” recovery
theory of equal treatment, then we will not confront the question
of which aggregation mechanism to espouse. These two definitions
of equal treatment of plaintiffs might not be the only possible definitions in these scenarios that I’m considering, however. As for
whether other definitions would require us to confront the aggregation mechanism question, it seems to me that additional accounts of how to treat the plaintiffs equally are likely to behave like
the “equal amount of happiness” theory and unlike the “equal percentage of loss” recovery theory. It seems to me that the “equal
percentage of loss” recovery theory is likely the only option that
would enable us to avoid the aggregation mechanism question in
scenarios like the ones I’m considering.
Thus, to the extent that one espouses a theory of equal treatment of plaintiffs that is not the “equal percentage of loss” recovery
theory, then the situations discussed here are examples of situations in the law that are not different-numbers problems, but which
still confront the question of which aggregation mechanism is the
75
most plausible. This is significant, because up until here, I have

75. While this is one way to classify these cases, it seems that a more accurate way to
classify these cases would be to say that they indeed are different-numbers problems, but
these different-numbers problems—unlike those I’ve discussed throughout the Article—do
not involve two states of affairs for the same person where one state of affairs for the person
is shorter due the person’s life having been shortened by some event. Here, we do have a
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only identified different-numbers problems as the types of situations where we confront the question of which aggregation mechanism is most plausible. The context discussed here in this extension Section thus expands the relevance of the discussions and
76
conclusions in this Article.
C. Extensions Regarding Different-Numbers Problems in the
Population-Wide Context
This Article has addressed the ways in which the law confronts
different-numbers problems. In so doing, the Article has focused
almost exclusively on the ways in which private law remedies confront different-numbers problems when tasked with valuing lives of
different lengths. It’s important to briefly note here, though, that
that there are also other ways in which the law does and will confront different-numbers problems.
Recall that different-numbers problems arise whenever we are
comparing the values of two wholes, where the two wholes are
composed of different numbers of parts, and where the values of
the wholes are a function of the values of their parts. While one
context in which this occurs is in comparing lives of different
lengths (which thus are composed of a different number of parts
(i.e., a different number of moments)), another context in which
this occurs is in comparing populations of different sizes (which
thus are composed of a different number of parts (i.e., a different
number of lives)). In the population-wide context, we again must
choose which aggregation mechanism (be it AU, TU, or some other option) is most plausible for assessing the value of the whole,
given the values of its parts. Again, the task of choosing which aggregation mechanism is most plausible is an extremely tricky one,
where all possible accounts confront seemingly devastatingly counterintuitive implications. The umbrella name for these questions in
the population-wide context is population ethics. While I will not
delve deeply into the topic here, I will briefly mention various ways
in which the law—and, more generally, society—confronts questions in population ethics (and thus ways in which the law con-

different-numbers problem, but the comparison is between two chunks of time of different
lengths, one of which belongs to one person and the other which belongs to a different person—but with both chunks of time that are compared being in the same state of affairs (i.e.,
in the same world, be it an actual or a merely possible world).
76. These comments still apply with the same force even if the appropriate terminology
is different, as discussed in the previous footnote. While the comments would apply with the
same force, the appropriate terminology would of course need to be substituted in for the
terminology I currently use.
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fronts different-numbers problems in a context other than the private law remedies context that has been the focus of this Article).
One example of a way in which society will confront differentnumbers problems in a population-wide context arises in a context
already discussed above: the context of self-driving cars. As I discussed, the programming of self-driving cars forces us to answer
questions about how to compare lives of different lengths. That
context, however, also requires us to answer questions about how
to compare populations of different sizes—i.e., how to trade off
deaths of a different number of people that would occur in different states of affairs. (For example, a programmer might have to
decide how to trade off the death of one passenger against the
deaths of three pedestrians.) Thus, technologies like self-driving
cars not only require us to confront different-numbers problems in
the context of comparing lives of different lengths (thus forcing
us, at least implicitly, to value the existence of more or fewer years
of life), but also different-numbers problems in the context of
populations of different sizes (thus forcing us, at least implicitly, to
value the existence of more or fewer lives).
While self-driving cars are one small example, policy topics confronting different-numbers problems in population ethics abound.
Among the various areas that confront these questions are: where
to put our medical and scientific research dollars (e.g., toward
technologies and practices associated with saving lives of fetuses
and infants, toward other life-saving technologies for adults, or
perhaps, on the other hand, toward quality-of-life-enhancing technologies such as things like hip replacements); whether we should
have laws or, more mildly, perhaps tax-incentives, that promote
larger or smaller families; and, perhaps, questions about to what
extent various resources should be conserved (assuming some type
of relationship between resources and a population’s size and between resources and a population’s happiness).
These are just a few examples. Different-numbers problems in a
population-wide context already are confronted by the law and by
society in a huge range of areas, and it is crucial for us to articulate
a plausible solution to different-numbers problems in the population-wide context as well.
D. Summary Regarding Extensions
Even without the considerations raised and discussed in the
foregoing extension Sections, the discussions and conclusions of
the Article pertain to a substantial number of cases that are not
relegated to the mere periphery of the law. As we can now see,
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however, the implications and effects of the Article’s discussions
are even more wide-ranging than we might have thought. This is
both because (1) the types of situations addressed in the Article
are likely to grow in prevalence and importance in the future as
technology develops, and (2) because there are a variety of other
ways—even here and now, in the present—in which the law confronts different-numbers problems, and these additional ways in
which the law confronts different-numbers problems had not yet
been discussed in the Article.
CONCLUSION
The contributions of this Article have been both theoretical and
practical. The theoretical: The discussions and conclusions of this
Article provide analysis and insight in areas where there have been
gaps in legal theory. This is the case for all of the discussions of the
Article, but, perhaps most notably, the discussions regarding (1)
precisifying and better understanding the notion of “the level that
a person is (or was) at,” (2) different-numbers problems and their
application to legal topics, (3) whether a person is harmed by having his death be sooner than it otherwise would be, and (4) whether a person should be compensated for having his life shortened,
to name just a few of the topics addressed. These gaps in legal theory (as well as other gaps in legal theory that the Article addressed)
exist and have existed, despite being gaps that have resulted in
vagueness, imprecision, and under-description in notions and
terms that are ubiquitous in the law. Noticing that these gaps exist
and showing them to the reader is the key first step that this Article
carries out. Second, the Article attempts to provide answers to
many of the questions, and to at least lay the foundations for answers to others. The analysis here thus constitutes theoretical progress toward articulating a more precise and exhaustive theory underlying our legal principles. This is the theoretical contribution.
The Article’s theoretical contribution also results in important
practical contributions. Most important are the practical implications associated with potential compensation for a person who has
his life shortened. As is, the law does not provide compensation to
a person for his having his life shortened. This position is in great
tension with commonsense intuitions according to which little if
anything is a more serious harm than having one’s life shortened.
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If it turns out that our commonsense intuitions are correct, then
there is an egregious gap in the law that needs to be filled. This Article helps lay the foundation for the inquiry into the questions of
whether a person is harmed by having his life shortened, and if so,
how great this harm is. Depending on what our answers are to
these questions, the current state of the law might need to undergo
significant changes. These changes would affect private law remedies and affect the lives of very many people. Furthermore, it seems
very likely that our answers will dictate the result that changes do
need to be made. Further still, these practical effects of the discussions in this Article (and of the discussions that it lays the foundation for) will likely grow in importance and prevalence as technology develops in the coming years. We must not lose time both (1)
in determining whether a change should be made, and, if so, (2)
in bringing about this change.
Lastly, the goals of this Article can also be described at a higher
level of generality: These goals are to bring about a legal system
that better furthers both fairness and efficiency. As for fairness: to
the extent that the law can have remedies that more accurately
(and precisely) track the harms that are incurred, this will minimize instances of over- and under-compensation and thus bring
about greater fairness. As for efficiency: the more accurately (and
precisely) that remedies track the harms that are incurred, the
more that those two things will happen, both of which will result in
greater efficiency: (1) to the extent that remedies begin to more
accurately track harms in situations where the remedies had been
either non-existent or too small to fully compensate a party, the
more accurate tracking of remedies to harms will force parties to
internalize the externalities they would otherwise impose, and this
will lead to greater efficiency. Additionally, and conversely, (2) to
the extent that remedies begin to more accurately track harms in
situations where the remedies had been too large (either for an activity that currently is mistakenly thought to cause harm to others
or that is correctly thought to cause harm to others but where the
amount of this harm is overestimated), the more accurate tracking
of remedies to harms will enable parties to avoid liability (or the
threat of liability), the latter of which could have a distortionary effect on behavior, thus causing non-optimally-efficient behavior.
My hope is that the considerations in this Article and the changes to the law that they set in motion can make progress with respect to both fairness and efficiency.

